The Foreign Service Journal, June 2015

50 JUNE 2015 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL require engaging in Cuba to foster change and move Cuba toward a better future. Fortunately, President Barack Obama has ordered a comprehensive overhaul of our failed Cuban policy in an effort to change Cuba. How? Neither Obama, nor Raul Castro, nor anyone can know. But the actuarial tables for the Castro brothers tell us change is imminent. Raul hopes for a China-like outcome, but fears a Russia-like outcome. Change is his enemy; the more rapid and fundamental, the more dangerous for him. A wise policy will engage with the weakened regime. We dealt successfully with Stalin, Mao and others. Surely we can do so with the Castro brothers. Diplomacy, which led the United States to success in the Cold War and to assist Chinese leaders in moving their country out of the miasma of Maoism, can be an important tool for us in Cuba. But we must give our- selves the possibility of employing it. Even so, one big negative is the caudillo factor. Only one entity in Cuba is a strong, unitary, disciplined, ubiquitous, well-armed national institution: the Cuban Army. It has a hand in every aspect of Cuban society. The Cuban Communist Party is another unitary, ubiquitous national institution, but not disciplined or well-armed. It also has the burden of having created a failed “Fidelismo” ideology, a failed economy and a corrupt society. In its current sclerotic condition, the party is unlikely to muster the energy or imagination to lead fundamental change. Therefore, the most likely outcome is an army-led continuation of caudillismo. Only a wise policy, executed in cooperation with our neighbors and the Europeans, can make a better outcome possible. Time for a New Approach Since the Cold War ended, the United States has failed to reas- sess its global position, much less develop a thoughtful national security strategy. Many of our international difficulties are explained by this failure to set priorities and apply our resources strategically. Instead, we lurch from crisis to crisis guided, at best, by tactical objectives. Our hemispheric policies suffer from this underlying failure, as well. How we deal with our neighbors further complicates hemi- spheric relations. Our attention to each region is partial, episodic and crisis-centered. We are the only nation that treats its neigh- borhood as just another global region. In part, we do this because it is rarely in crisis. Latin America is better governed, more stable and democratic, and less crisis-ridden and poor than most of Africa, Asia or the Middle East. It would get more attention, ironi- cally, were it more crisis-ridden. There are important lessons for us in this. With the right policies and the right leaders, the poten- tial to develop strong democratic institutions in Latin America is greater than in most of the rest of the world. Introspection and self-evaluation do not come easily to our southern neighbors, however. They must accept that they and their culture are, and have been, the primary force determining their destiny—not the “Colossus of the North.” Conversely, we must learn that our way is not always their way. And to play a constructive role, we need to develop a stronger commitment to, and deeper understanding of, our neighborhood. Caudillos will not disappear soon, alas. So, wherever possible, we should engage with them diplomatically, but openly support an institutional path to democracy, even if that advocacy dam- ages our relations. In addition, millions of people throughout the hemisphere who are excluded from political, social and economic opportunity by abject poverty and lack of education need to be brought into the mainstream for long-term stability and prosperity. Hemispheric free trade and economic cooperation should be a cornerstone strategic goal of the United States. To succeed, we need to give the president fast-track authority to negotiate trade agreements. Not surprisingly, nations on the institutional path have, also, been hemispheric leaders in trade and economic cooperation inside the neighborhood and beyond. Colombia, Mexico, Chile and Peru are leaders in the Pacific Alliance along with Costa Rica, another nation practicing institutionalism. The Trans-Pacific Partnership counts Chile, Peru and Mexico among its 12 members. There are reasons for optimism. Four of the five most populous nations with 75 percent of the region’s population and six of the top 10 economies have started, or are advanced, on the path of democratic institutionalism. It is not an accident that economic reforms were the driving force behind democratic change in Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Brazil. Effective economic institu- tions have shown a capacity for beneficial spillover effects on political and social developments in Latin America. Yet progress is not easy or quickly achieved. Institutionalized democracy in Latin America has been, heretofore, the path less traveled; but should our neighbors decide to take it, it will make all the difference. n Caudillo politics in Venezuela have kept an otherwise wealthy country far poorer than it should be.