The Foreign Service Journal, June 2019

18 JUNE 2019 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL bad, pointing to a huge jump in indica- tors for gross domestic product, life expectancy, education, maternal health, and access to electricity, TV and the rest of the world. We also acknowledged the other side: intractable poverty rates, violence and corruption. A colleague once observed to me that we overidentified Afghan progress with our own self-worth. I sat in countless meetings with U.S. officials saying they were personally offended by failures of Afghan governance, whether or not it involved our funds. Our requirement for their military transformation has included well-meaning technological dependence that proves unworkable in practice (for example, aircraft that need higher-level maintenance than Afghans will be able to afford in the future). Members of the Afghan political class—learning our ways better than we have been learning theirs—know that we want to hear pledges of reform; but they know equally well what the minimum will be to satisfy us. Rightsizing Our Expectations, Presence and Timelines We need an articulation of long-term U.S. goals for engagement in the country and the region, something equivalent to more consistent policies that have sur- vived partisan changes over time, such as containment in Europe or trade promo- tion in Latin America. This requires put- ting Afghanistan in proper perspective, taking a deep breath and admitting that it will remain a problem beyond short- term fixes. That is not the same as giving up, which would be a massive strategic blunder and a disservice to those who have worked and sacrificed so much on all sides. “Why are we still there?” is the wrong policy question. I would counter: “Why wouldn’t we be there?” We have embassies all over the world. We have a military presence in dozens of locations worldwide that we consider to have geostrategic importance. The right policy question is this: “What should our optimal presence be in the future, and how do we get there rationally, without creating opportunity costs (such as having to return after withdrawing too precipitously) or a chance for competitors to increase their influence?” Seeing this country for what it is, and is not, would generate a more rational policy debate. Afghanistan is a mid- sized, poor country with an increas- ingly better-educated and more urban population, many of whom have lived as refugees abroad and speak English. It is landlocked, but near massive energy reserves, and possesses mineral wealth and agricultural riches. It is socially conservative. And it is situated near countries we want to keep an eye on. Congressional and U.S. public opin- ion appears to blow hot and cold, which may have much to do with how they hear the issues framed during a talk or What should our optimal presence be in the future, and how do we get there rationally, without creating opportunity costs or a chance for competitors to increase their influence?