The Foreign Service Journal, June 2021

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JUNE 2021 27 port a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues, consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people on Taiwan” and “to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capabil- ity.” It concluded: “Our commitment to Taiwan is rock-solid and contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and within the region.” Just How Solid Is the Commitment? Despite such official statements, Richard Haass and David Sacks at the Council on Foreign Relations note in a Septem- ber 2020 Foreign Affairs article that the U.S. government has maintained a policy of “strategic ambiguity” over the past four decades that “resisted answering the question of whether the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if China mounted an armed attack.” They note that the Taiwan Rela- tions Act only calls on the United States to “provide Taiwan arms of a defensive character” and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” While acknowledging that this policy has maintained cross- strait stability thus far, Haass and Sacks argue that ambiguity is “unlikely to deter an increasingly assertive China with growing military capabilities.” They recommend that the U.S. govern- ment “introduce a policy of strategic clarity: one that makes explicit that the United States would respond to any Chinese use of force against Taiwan” while clearly stating its adherence to the one-China policy. They warn that the failure of the United States to respond to such a Chinese use of force would under- mine U.S. credibility among its allies, such as Japan and South Korea, across the region. Following publication of this article, other foreign policy analysts raised alarms about the proposed change in the U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity.” Some contend that a change was unnecessary because China, despite its provocative military exercises, is still unlikely to attack Taiwan. Others argue that Beijing’s increasing pressure on Taiwan could be seen as a reac- tion to provocative U.S. and Taiwanese policies. Some are con- cerned that such a commitment would demand a much larger defense budget than the United States could afford. Above all, these analysts express concerns that a policy of “strategic clar- ity” with respect to Taiwan could actually provoke Beijing into launching an attack on Taiwan. Putting aside the merits of these arguments for the moment, this open debate has highlighted questions about the credibility of U.S. commitments to Taipei. Does the United States view the step-up of Chinese military exercises against Taiwan as justifi- able or as a “form of coercion”? If the former, would the United States intervene to help defend Taiwan? If the latter, does the U.S. government currently have the political will or capacity to help defend Taiwan? In a recent survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, while a majority of American opinion leaders favored the use of U.S. troops to support Taiwan in a Chinese invasion, only about 40 percent of the general public favored such action. It thus appears that there is still significant uncer- tainty among Americans as to whether the United States should or will actually defend Taiwan against an increasingly powerful Chinese military. A Moment for Clarity President Biden has underscored repeatedly that he considers the promotion of democracy and human rights values abroad as one of his highest foreign policy priorities. He indicated that in his first year in office, the United States will host a global Summit for Democracy to, as he put it in an article in the March/April 2020 Foreign Affairs , “renew the spirit and shared purpose of the nations of the free world” and “bring together the world’s democracies to strengthen our democratic institutions, honestly confront nations that are backsliding, and forge a common agenda to fight corruption, defend against authoritarianism and advance human rights.” With reference to Taiwan, Biden wrote in an Oct. 22, 2020, opinion piece in the World Journal (a Taiwanese Chinese- language newspaper published in America) that the United States will “stand with friends and allies to advance our shared prosperity, security and values in the Asia-Pacific region. That includes deepening our ties with Taiwan, a leading democracy, major economy, technology power- house—and a shining example of how an open society can effectively contain COVID-19.” Does the United States view the step-up of Chinese military exercises against Taiwan as justifiable or as a “formof coercion”?