The Foreign Service Journal, June 2021

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JUNE 2021 29 ing Chinese economy that is heavily dependent on international trade and investments. It would also be impossible to avoid collateral damage that would endanger the lives and interests of a sizable foreign pop- ulation in Taiwan, thus forcing a widespread global response. Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to imagine the U.S. military in the region remaining uninvolved. While some in China may initially support such an invasion, there would almost certainly be substantial domestic opposition, including from those who have visited or have family and business ties to Taiwan, questioning the necessity of the conflict, especially as Chinese casualties and economic repercussions mount. Hence, an armed invasion of Taiwan would be Beijing’s very last resort because its tremendous costs would far outweigh any possible benefit China could derive even from a “successful” invasion. Thus, as I see it, Beijing’s increasing provocations do not necessarily suggest that it is currently preparing for an armed conflict. Rather, these actions are designed to intimidate and to create and fuel doubts about U.S. commitments to Taiwan and, increasingly, to isolate and undermine the morale of the people of Taiwan. Beijing’s ultimate goal, in the tradition of China’s war strategist Sun Tzu’s The Art of War , is to use military intimida- tion to divide and coerce the people of Taiwan into accepting Beijing’s formula for political reunification, which, as in the case of Hong Kong, it can then discard after assuming greater con- trol. In short, Beijing is seeking to win a war through intimida- tion and without the actual use of force. To counter this strategy, the United States must stand firm and counter China’s intimidation tactics. It should demonstrate its commitment to help defend Taiwan and its democracy, and deepen the bilateral relationship in ways that bind our inter- ests and values. In confronting China, the United States should be prepared to accept greater risks and be prepared to defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion, if necessary. The objective should be to convince Beijing that the use of military intimida- tion and coercion against Taiwan will only backfire, making China’s goal of political reunification even more difficult, if not impossible. At the same time, the United States should also make clear that it welcomes dialogue and a peaceful resolution of cross-strait ties that fully respects the wishes and interests of the people of Taiwan. At the same time, the United States must make it very clear to the people of Taiwan that we “have your backs”; and we need to work with Taiwan to bolster our joint defense capability. The United States needs to assure the people of Taiwan that our commitment is not transactional, and that we will defend their freedom to determine their own political future in cross-strait negotiations without fear of Chinese intimidation. The United States should make clear to all that it is committed to ensur- ing that, as mandated in the TRA, “the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means” and not through the use of force or coercion. Strategic Ambiguity and Its Risks There are risks to maintaining the strategy of ambiguity as Chinese military power builds up in the coming years. First, this strategy will not reduce Beijing’s increasing assertiveness toward Taiwan and the region. Frommy own involvement in many years of negotiations with Chinese officials, it is my view that Beijing will see a U.S. effort to hang on to this strategy simply as a sign of weakness and fear, not clever diplomacy, and will seek to exploit this weakness by increasing the pressure and pushing for concessions from both Taiwan and the United States. I believe we are seeing this play out today. In time, the lack of a clear U.S. commitment will allow Beijing to succeed in sowing doubts about U.S. credibility—not only among the people of Taiwan, but in the region and the world as a whole. Second, as the people of Taiwan sense a relatively weak- ened U.S. commitment, many more will succumb to Chinese pressures and seek a cross-strait compromise that does not reflect their own values and interests, but their fears. For oth- ers, especially in the pro-independence camp, this could result in greater frustration and even desperation that could lead to an open push for Taiwan independence to force the hands of both Beijing and the United States. This would create a serious dilemma for the United States either to defend Taiwan or simply accept a Beijing-imposed reunification solution along the lines of Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems.” The former could lead to an armed conflict, while the latter would essentially destroy Taiwan’s democracy and U.S. international credibility for the foreseeable future. There are risks tomaintaining the strategy of ambiguity as Chinese military power builds up in the coming years.