The Foreign Service Journal, June 2021

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JUNE 2021 35 The U.S. “Big Three” Particularly important for Biden administration relations with Europe are the three big areas of U.S. concern about challenges to its security and other interests: Russia, Iran and China. Russia. NATO will hold a summit on June 14 in Brussels. A key focus is the most recent alliance review, “ NATO 2030, ” a comprehensive study of NATO’s strategic environment and a long list of recommendations. Yet Russia will be the summit’s centerpiece, including European desires to help shape Biden administration attitudes and policies toward Moscow. The summit’s deliberations will ratify commitments and actions to reassure allied states, especially those nearest to Russia, and to make clear to Moscow that, on the fundamentals, the allies “do not divide.” The alliance will also take on all Russian power- projection challenges, including cyber security, emerging and disrupting technologies, and interference in Western demo- cratic politics. Still, formal allied agreement on opposing Russian ambitions in Europe (and elsewhere) is not as straight- forward as it may seem—certainly not as clear-cut as during the Cold War or even immediately following Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea and incursions into other parts of Ukraine, with intensified threats this year. During the last several years, the U.S. approach to Russia has been drifting, on a bipartisan basis, toward lasting confrontation, if not an actual cold war. Trump took a progressively tougher line toward Mos- cow as he came under political attack for coddling Vladimir Putin. The possibilities for cooperation that Trump and Putin discussed at their July 2018 summit in Helsinki went nowhere when the U.S. media focused only on a belief about a cozy Trump-Putin relationship. President Biden has himself taken a hard line toward Russia, even though he has acknowledged the value of cooperating when possible and proposed to meet with Putin. (On the critical nuclear arms control agreement, New START, the two sides did agree in February to a five-year extension.) The bottom line is that the United States is the only country with the weight to deal with Russia, and all the allies know it. Thus, keeping America “in” is still critical insurance and will continue to be so indefinitely. Yet the allies are not united in attitudes toward Russia. As a rule, the farther an ally is physi- cally from the Russian frontier, the more flexible is its national position. Otherwise, in a significant difference with Washing- ton, Germany plans to continue with the Nord Stream 2 natu- ral gas pipeline under the Baltics from Russia, which Biden and the U.S. Congress have opposed, with the latter authoriz- ing sanctions on firms working on the pipeline. In the end, U.S. differences with some European countries on Russia and Vladimir Putin won’t pose a fundamental threat to ties across the Atlantic; but “anti-Russia” will not suffice as glue for trans-Atlantic relations, even with understanding of U.S. preeminence in dealing with Moscow. In the NATO combination of “deterrence plus dialogue,” Biden and his team have inclined more to the former, many Europeans to the lat- ter. In the United States, domestic opposition to attempts to build a different future with Russia remains formidable, and there is so far no evidence that Putin would respond positively. For Biden, getting Russia policy right will entail considerable efforts with allies and other Europeans, as well as with Russia. Middle East (focusing on Iran). Perspectives within the NATO alliance and the European Union, including between the United States and most European allies, diverge on some other “outside of area” matters. The Middle East and environs are the focus of at least two differences. The first is general: As the Biden administration seems to be following the Trump administration in wanting to reduce the U.S. footprint in the region (beginning with departure of U.S. and allied troops from Afghanistan by Sept. 11), it is likely to want Europeans to assume more responsibility for promoting Western interests in some other parts of the region. That will not be popular with most Europeans. The second is specific. Ever since Trump in May 2018 withdrew from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran—a signal achievement of the Obama administration and a major contribution to regional security and stability— most Europeans have worried that the risks of crisis or even conflict would increase, especially when Iran subsequently began moving away from some JCPOA-agreed limitations on its nuclear program. “Anti-Russia” will not suffice as glue for trans-Atlantic relations, even with understanding of U.S. preeminence in dealing withMoscow.