The Foreign Service Journal, June 2021

36 JUNE 2021 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL President Biden has consistently declared his commitment to rejoining the JCPOA, and this is popular in Europe. Like his predecessors, he has also expressed a desire to deal with other Iranian behavior beyond the “nuclear file,” notably Iran’s ballistic missile program, support for regional proxies from Yemen to Lebanon and what many Americans believe to be its leading role in promoting terrorism (largely ignoring Saudi Arabia’s role). Yet both Biden and his top officials long argued that, before the United States rejoins the JCPOA or reduces U.S. sanctions on Iran, the latter must first return to compli- ance with the agreement. In particular, Tehran must reverse uranium enrichment undertaken since May 2018. Iran takes the opposite position: that the United States, having quit the JCPOA, must move first. Arm’s-length nego- tiations did start in March; but if they do not lead to a break- through, and America keeps its full sanctions regime in place, there will be major European misgivings because of the grow- ing risks of a deepening crisis. China. A further potential long-term problem for trans- Atlantic relations is China. There are already stresses within the alliance because the United States is “pivoting” signifi- cantly to Asia, as the Obama administration inelegantly put it, in order to face Beijing’s rising power, position and ambitions. Greater U.S. preoccupation with China than with Europe is a natural evolution of geopolitics and geoeconomics, even with Russia factored in. But the China issue will have an additional impact on U.S. relations with its European allies because, like its predecessor, the Biden administration expects the Europe- ans to follow the U.S. lead. There is also a “do no harm” aspect—namely, U.S. concern over increasing Chinese economic penetration of European countries (and the European Union), as part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. This was underscored by the E.U.-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment concluded two days after Biden’s inauguration. The Biden administration also wants the Europeans to support all elements of U.S. confron- tation with China. Fortunately for Western comity, there is virtual unanimity on the need for the “Western” organization of international economic relations and rulemaking to prevail over any Chinese alternative. But few, if any, European states will sign on to the full U.S. agenda in dealing with China. It was one thing for the alliance to send troops to Afghani- stan after 9/11, when neighboring Russia was supine, to make sure the United States would not lessen its strategic interest in Europe. It would be quite another to give open-ended support for U.S. efforts to contain China, a major power that poses no security threats (e.g., terrorism) in Europe. Except where a clear common interest is established, the Biden administra- tion will find few, if any, European takers. Values and Interests: Nonmilitary Trans-Atlantic Issues In addition to securing U.S. interests abroad, the Biden administration also wants to promote democracy, a second- order U.S. priority since the Obama administration. This has a values and ideology dimension, but it also has a geopoliti- cal purpose, with China, Iran and Russia as key targets. To try building a common front with allied and partner countries, Biden has proposed a summit of democracies. At this writing, it is not clear that this idea has been thought through, includ- ing who gets invited and who does not (not a trivial matter!), what the agenda would be and what “deliverables” there would be in addition to rhetoric. Thus, a democracy summit contains risks, including in trans-Atlantic relations, if comity is not more or less guaranteed in advance. Since the end of the Cold War, both security in Europe and trans-Atlantic ties have increasingly moved beyond NATO’s preeminence, although it remains the key institutional link across the Atlantic and is highly popular with the American people and Congress. Except for challenges and threats posed by Russia since 2014—significant in themselves—nonmilitary factors have become increasingly significant. Since early 2020, COVID-19 has been most important, and cooperation across the Atlantic has in general been posi- tive: President Biden’s clarity and commitment on COVID-19 have been most welcome in Europe. But the same coopera- tion across the Atlantic (other than by Canada on the North American side) cannot be said about the dramatic rise in immigration to Europe from Africa and especially the Middle East, the latter to a great extent the result of the ill-conceived 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Immigration has proved to be the most important source of political and social stress ever since within the E.U. Few, if any, European states will sign on to the full U.S. agenda in dealing with China.