The Foreign Service Journal, June 2021

38 JUNE 2021 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL European Union. But this has advanced at a snail’s pace since, as U.S. ambassador to NATO in 1993, I coined the follow- ing aphorism: “NATO and the European Commission are two institutions living in the same city on separate planets.” Franco-American cooperation did lead to some ties between NATO and the Western European Union, now the Common Security and Defence Policy; but these have hardly progress ed since then. Notably, at the February Munich Security Conference President Biden made only one brief reference to the E.U.: “The United States will work closely with our European Union partners and the capitals across the continent—from Rome to Riga—to meet the range of shared challenges we face.” Meanwhile, although NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg had little new to say on this subject, the “NATO 2030” report has sensibly proposed, as a beginning, a summit- level meeting between NATO and the E.U. countries—an idea I have pressed, without success, for every NATO summit since 1999. President Biden and the Europeans have a chance to get this right. A cooperative and task-sharing relationship between NATO and the E.U. that recognizes the comprehensive, intercon- nected nature of security needs to be high on the agenda—not a “security” based on one or another “tool,” but an encom- passing method with overall commitments and activities, both public and private. The Issue of Burden-Sharing The matter of how security burdens and responsibilities are to be shared is significant. Not surprisingly, given the Trump administration’s attitudes toward Europe, the decades-old idea of an independent European defense force gained added support. Two years ago, French President Emmanuel Macron asserted that NATO is experiencing “brain-death,” and that the E.U. should gain “military sovereignty” separate from NATO. As demonstrated by fledgling efforts in the 1990s, the two institutions can reinforce each other. Yet no one doubts that, if there were a military threat to Europe (i.e., from Russia), only NATO and the United States could act. U.S. (and NATO) reluctance regarding separate European defense ambitions continues, as reflected in Stoltenberg’s comments at Munich: “Any attempt to weaken the trans- Atlantic bond will not only weaken NATO, but it will also divide Europe; so we have to have Europe and North America together in NATO. That’s the best way.” This concern should have been overcome long ago, both to help meet U.S. demands for greater European NATO burden-sharing and to lessen worries about U.S. steadfastness. Joe Biden has dramatically lessened European doubts fostered by Donald Trump; but what happens with the next U.S. president? In the meantime, there will be renewed American appeals to get allies to “pull their weight” in defense spending. At its 2014 Wales Summit, NATO set a goal for each ally to spend at least 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, although it is certain that not all the allies—maybe not even a majority—will meet that goal by its putative deadline of 2024, despite overall allied spending on defense going up signifi- cantly. The goal was problematic from the outset: It said more about “inputs” than about “outputs,” and it failed to under- stand adequately that “security” in Europe is about many factors, of which military strength is only one. A far better goal would be, say, 3 percent of GDP—but with a significant part going to economic development of Central European coun- tries, a key underpinning of the continent’s security. Leadership Is a Two-Way Street Secretary of State Antony Blinken has stressed the role of American leadership: bringing countries together “because they trust us to lead, and no one can unite others like we can.” This is an ambitious project, but it does not command auto- matic support in Europe. This is particularly so when it comes to “outside of area” engagements. During the months ahead, President Biden has a chance to demonstrate renewed U.S. leadership; but also important is engaging European efforts, which are far from guaranteed. Biden’s earning renewed trust in the United States is the most basic facet of “America is back,” but it’s also true that “leader- ship,” cooperation and compromise are a two-way street. Both America and Europe need to take note. n President Biden has a chance to demonstrate renewed U.S. leadership; but also important is engaging European efforts, which are far fromguaranteed.