The Foreign Service Journal, June 2022

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JUNE 2022 23 nia. While most Moldovans reject this overreach, the affinity for all things Romanian remains strong and has, in my opinion, stalled a stronger sense of national identity and driven a wedge between the Romanian- speaking majority and other ethnic minorities in Moldova, most notably in Transnistria. I worked hard as ambassador to improve Ameri- can relations with Transnistria. I developed a cordial relationship with the current “president,” Vadim Kras- noselsky, and his “foreign minister,” Vitaly Ignatiev. I hosted Transnistrian businesspeople and exporters who made forays into the U.S. market. The embassy hosted and participated in numerous academic and cultural exchanges and events in Transnistria. We even had some sporadic dealings on both security and intelligence issues. That said, neither Transnistrian authorities nor residents had any interest in giving up their close relationship with the Russian Federation, which still includes subsidies and fairly robust military protection. The recent explosions reported in Transnistria targeting police and infrastructure targets have all the hallmarks of a “false flag” operation designed to encourage Russian intervention. More recently, there were reports of an armed assault on the Soviet- era munitions storage facility in Cobasna, also in Transnistria. Cobasna poses both a safety threat to surrounding villages as well as a possible attractive military objective for invading Russian forces. Given the near total reliance of Transnistria on Russian largesse, it is unlikely that the Transnistrians would in any way block such intervention. Moldova’s Vulnerability As in Ukraine, Moldova is making progress in fostering a pro-Western society. After years of corruption under various oligarchs, Moldova recently elected a pro-E.U. president, Maia Sandu. She replaced the very pro-Russian Igor Dodon, whose party’s campaign slogan had been “Together with Russia.” Per capita, Moldova has taken in more Ukrainian refugees than any other nation. A neutrality clause in its constitution has thus far prevented Chisinau from applying for NATO membership, but it is vigorously seeking to accelerate its membership in the E.U. With neither E.U. nor NATO membership, Moldova’s vulnerabil- ity to Russian aggression is palpable and cause for great concern. Even were Russia not to invade Moldova beyond the Nistru (or Dniester) River (i.e., beyond the security zone demarcating Transnistria), the breakaway territory would be a logical west- ern anchor to Moscow’s desired control of Ukraine’s southern flank—an anchor that, in my perception, would welcome a more direct relationship with the Russian Federation. As a territory recognized by no one, not even by Russia, as a sovereign country, many, if not most, Transnistrians crave the prospect of enhanced Russian protection and recognition. While Moldova’s official stance and that of the OSCE-chaired 5 plus 2 is the ultimate reintegration of Transnistria, most Moldo- van citizens I spoke with had little interest in Transnistria and considered it a foreign country. Therefore, the main obstacle for the Russians at this point in time—albeit a significant one—is the Ukrainian port of Odesa (or Odessa), which by all accounts will put up stiff resistance to the Russians. This supposition leads to the question posed by this article: Will Russia invade Moldova? Only Putin knows the answer. On its face, an attack on this tiny nation would not present Russia with anything near the difficulties of its ongoing, halting efforts in Ukraine. What I often heard as ambassador, however, gives rise to an alternative possibility. Given Romania’s intensely close rela- tionship with Moldova, would this NATO country sit by as Russia takes over Chisinau? What would the impact be for other NATO allies were Romania to dispatch troops to Moldova? Individual member nations of NATO have engaged in military combat outside the NATO region for various political and strate- gic purposes over the years. Such “adventures” in a third country fall outside the North Atlantic Treaty, but are not completely without risk of drawing NATO into a conflict should escalation lead to consequences that might require a response by other NATOmembers under Article 5. Hopefully, these troubling possibilities will give pause to Putin as he contemplates achievement of his own feverish dream of a new and very destructive Russian world order. n LUCIDITY INFORMATIONDESIGN