The Foreign Service Journal, June 2023

22 JUNE 2023 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL because “framing tensions as an ideologi- cal struggle risks backing China into a corner, too,” leading Beijing to conclude that its only choice is military action. In their view, the United States has shifted to a policy of countering the threat the PRC poses to Taiwan (as reflected in President Biden’s repeated statements about U.S. commitment to intervene militarily on behalf of Taiwan) and “aban- doned any pretense of acting as a prin- cipled arbiter committed to preserving the status quo and allowing the two sides to come to their own peaceful settlement.” To evaluate the Biden administration’s responses and to determine the best U.S. policy in dealing with Beijing’s cross-Strait moves and the increased tension, we need first to understand the PRC’s strategy. What Game Is Beijing Playing? As I argued in my June 2021 article in these pages ( “Countering China’s Intimi- dation of Taiwan” ), given the anticipated cost of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, Bei- jing’s current cross-Strait strategy appears to be following the script of the classic Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu. He posited that the best way to win a war is without fighting it, that is, by employ- ing tools of coercion and intimidation to obtain concessions and, eventually, the enemy’s surrender. We have seen this strategy play out successfully in the case of Hong Kong, and it is now being applied against Tai- wan. Accordingly, I suspect that Beijing sees the recent calls in the U.S. to shift from open and determined resistance to its aggressive actions to a policy of understanding Beijing’s “anxieties” and providing various assurances to the PRC as evidence that its strategy is working. Biden’s recent statements about U.S. commitments to Taiwan and some analysts’ demands for greater “strategic clarity” in direct response to Beijing’s increasingly aggressive threats are now being criticized as dangerous and pro- vocative on the grounds that they may provide a “blank check” to advocates of Taiwan’s de jure independence, thereby provoking rather than deterring a PRC attack on Taiwan. Significantly, however, in my discus- sions with Taiwanese political figures and analysts from both sides of the aisle dur- ing recent visits to Taipei, I never encoun- tered any question as to where the Biden administration stood regarding the issue of Taiwan independence, especially as the October 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy clearly reiterated the decades- long U.S. position: “We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side, and do not support Taiwan independence.” (Rather, in view of the abrupt U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the current conflict in Ukraine, the ques- tion most often raised was whether the United States would in fact come to the assistance of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion absent any declaration of Taiwan independence.) Similarly, former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022 to underscore the United States’ “unwavering commitment to supporting Taiwan’s vibrant democracy” has been variously criticized as “political,” “gratu- itous,” and “reckless”—despite the fact that the visit had clear precedence, was endorsed by both the ruling and opposi- tion parties in Taiwan, was broadly wel- comed by the people of Taiwan, and had bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress. Finally, calls for expanding U.S. military capacity in light of China’s rising military power are now also being characterized as provocative, despite the clear mandate under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” In fact, the Biden administration has not changed long-standing U.S. policy and is responding to Beijing’s increas- ingly aggressive actions. Nonetheless, Beijing will continue to reject any call to renounce its use of force against Taiwan and will continue to apply even greater military and political pressure with the aim of further raising tensions. We saw Beijing’s determination in its strong military response to the recent authorization of $10 billion in loans for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, as well as its success in getting Honduras to switch diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing. Beijing’s ultimate goal is to create uncertainty about U.S. commitments in order to erode the confidence of the Taiwan people and, eventually, pressure a future Taiwan government into making concessions on the issue of reunification in an effort to ease tensions and avoid conflict. In fact, the Biden administration has not changed long-standing U.S. policy and is responding to Beijing’s increasingly aggressive actions.