The Foreign Service Journal, June 2023

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JUNE 2023 23 Speaking Out is the Journal ’s opinion forum, a place for lively discussion of issues affecting the U.S. Foreign Service and American diplomacy. The views expressed are those of the author; their publication here does not imply endorsement by the American Foreign Service Association. Responses are welcome; send them to journal@afsa.org . Dangers of Appeasement If the “sole metric” of U.S. statecraft is indeed to preserve peace and stabil- ity, then some might consider Beijing’s strategy as offering an acceptable solu- tion. Technically, it could be argued, this would allow “the two sides to come to their own peaceful settlement,” albeit as a result of Beijing’s intimidation. It may, after all, take many more years before Beijing can actually impose a solution in which it is able to exercise full control over Taiwan and achieve “Chinese reunification.” Mean- while, this “peaceful settlement” would arguably reduce the risk of a major power conflict between China and the United States, at least over Taiwan and for the time being. In my opinion, however, such an out- come would be recognized by the people in Taiwan and other democracies as the United States having wavered not only in its commitment to Taiwan but also more broadly in its support for demo- cratic values and the rules-based liberal international order. Successive U.S. presidents have praised Taiwan as “a beacon of democ- racy” in its remarkable transition from autocracy to democracy over the past two decades. Despite Beijing’s protesta- tions, President Biden invited Taiwan representatives to attend the Summit for Democracy in Washington in 2021. For the United States to accept a cross-Strait settlement that was clearly arrived at under duress will be seen as our abandoning not only the people of Taiwan, yet again, but also betraying the U.S. commitment to democracy. This would have a major impact on Japan and Korea and other democratic allies, who will have good cause to doubt U.S. com- mitments in the face of a rising China’s increasingly aggressive policies. Moreover, having succeeded in its strategy against Hong Kong and at least for now Taiwan, Beijing will be embold- ened to use the same strategy to pursue its interests around the region, starting with its territorial disputes with Japan and other countries in the South China Sea. I believe this will eventually lead to increased tensions—and perhaps even conflict in the region. It is also not clear to me whether this “peaceful settlement” will continue to be accepted by the people of Taiwan, even without the support of the United States. While a future Taiwan government may accept an initial settlement, an increas- ingly alienated and desperate Taiwan population may emerge to resist Chi- nese efforts to consolidate its hold over Taiwan, as we saw in the later years of the Ma Ying-jeou administration. So the question is: How long will peace and stability endure if Beijing continues to be able to pursue its strategy of intimidation in the region? Wise Statecraft My own understanding of modern history and diplomatic experience leads me to believe that wise statecraft is not just about easing tensions and avoid- ing conflict but also about adhering to fundamental values and thinking beyond current challenges. Hence, I believe the United States should first build the capacity, as per the TRA, “to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” This requires maintaining a credible military deterrent in response to Beijing’s increas- ing military threats. Beyond this, it is equally critical that the United States demonstrate its political will to defend Taiwan and its democracy. While continuing to make clear its opposi- tion to “any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side,” the United States should respond firmly to Beijing’s threats in both statements and actions (e.g., pledging and strengthening military cooperation and further congressional engagement to bolster the trust and con- fidence of the Taiwan people in the U.S. commitment). It should also seek more broadly to enlist the cooperation of Japan and other democratic allies in this effort. At the same time, the United States should strengthen its “extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations” with Taiwan (as stated in the TRA), for example, by completing a substantive bilateral trade agreement as soon as possible. Last but not least, Washington should continue to underscore that the United States values Taiwan not just as a military or economic asset but also as “a beacon of democracy.” It should encourage fur- ther civil society ties between Taiwan and the United States, as well as with other democracies around the world. The ultimate goal is to convince Beijing that its only path to Chinese reunification is not through coercion but through the free and willing consent of the people of Taiwan. While such state- craft may not reduce current tensions, we need to make it clear to Chinese leaders that the United States and our allies will not succumb to its strategy of intimida- tion now or in the future. n