The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2004

The Background to Butchery In 1986, President Yoweri Museveni, leader of the dominant political party known as “The Movement,” deposed the short-lived military junta of Tito Okello. Museveni’s victory over Okello produced resentment from the Acholi population in the north, who would once again be ruled by a southern-influenced government. For decades the north-south divide resulted in the Acholi being marginalized and even massacred by previous gov- ernment leaders. After Okello’s departure from office, Alice Lakwena organized a group of ethnic Acholi sup- porters known as the Holy Spirit Mobile Force in opposi- tion to Museveni’s rule. Lakwena, whose followers con- sidered her a prophet and spir- itual guide, led the HSMF against Museveni in a futile attempt at resistance. Confi- dent of her spiritual powers, she sent her followers into bat- tle armed only with sticks and anointed with butter oil. Despite her faith that the lubricant and her divine power would shield members of her group against bullets, the HSMF were no match for Museveni’s well-organized and battle-ready soldiers. With the HSMF nearly wiped out, Lakwena fled to Kenya. Joseph Kony, Lakwena’s nephew and self-pro- claimed “spiritual heir,” gathered what was left of the HSMF and renamed it the Lord’s Resistance Army. Under Kony’s leadership a new chapter of violence was launched. The LRA started with small or “soft” targets, but eventually gained enough experience to carry out large guerilla-style attacks. In the 1990s, in an effort to create a climate of fear, the LRA began targeting civil- ians and abducting children for use as soldiers. Since its inception, the group has engaged in a systematic cam- paign against the northern areas of Uganda, attacking from its military camps within the country and from across the border in southern Sudan. Complicating matters further, in 1995 the govern- ment of Sudan took up support of the LRA in retaliation for Uganda‘s support of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, which had been at war with the Sudanese government since 1983. Four years later, in 1999, Sudan and Uganda restored diplomatic relations and both governments agreed to end support of the two rebel groups. In March 2002, the Sudanese government permitted the Ugandan People’s Defense Force to enter Sudanese territory in pursuit of LRA forces and to rescue abducted children. The UPDF initiative came to be known as “Operation Iron Fist.” While the military operation resulted in the rescue of many abducted children, it also intensified the military conflict in northern Uganda between the LRA and gov- ernment troops, which continues to disrupt every aspect of life of the Acholi people, and, in effect, expanded the theater of war. During the mil- itary campaign, the rebels were driven from their four main camps on the eastern bank of the White Nile and scattered into smaller bands. Eventually the LRA fled deeper into Sudan. In an effort to evade Ugandan troops, the rebels adopted a slash-and-burn poli- cy that has destroyed villages and taken the lives of innocent civilians on both sides of the Uganda/Sudan border. Observ- ers believe that the LRA is retali- ating against the Sudanese government by attacking govern- ment-controlled villages in the south. Meanwhile, efforts by the Ugandan government to protect internally displaced persons and prevent further abductions and killings are seriously inadequate. Innocent civilians and IDPs continue to be targeted by both the LRA and Ugandan forces. Large communities have been uprooted and thousands have been forced to leave their ancestral lands due to the fighting. In response to increased insurgent activity in October 2002, the government ordered 100,000 individuals to leave their villages within 48 hours and gather in displacement camps. The government said it would protect individuals who moved into the camps, but critics claim the facilities are merely a ploy by the government to further marginalize the population in the north. More than 800,000 IDPs have been placed in 12 overcrowded camps in northern Uganda, where they face acute food shortages and a lack of proper medication. The UPDF has failed to provide protection to individuals living in the camps: LRA rebels routinely make their way into them under cover of dark- J U LY- A U G U S T 2 0 0 4 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 67 A quasi-religious insurgency, the LRA is focused on overthrowing President Museveni and ruling according to the Ten Commandments and its own pseudo-Christian beliefs.