The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2004

70 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U LY- A U G U S T 2 0 0 4 included adopting a peaceful approach to resolving political dif- ferences. In the end, the report had little impact on the president’s polit- ical advisers and was not imple- mented. In August 2002, the Acholi Parliamentary Group in Gulu pre- sented a memorandum to Pres. Museveni calling for a cease-fire between that UPDF and the LRA. That October, members of the Lango and Acholi parliamentary groups met with cultural, religious and district political leaders and security officers stationed in the municipality of Lira. The goal of the meeting was to discuss a peaceful solution to the war and the imple- mentation of development objec- tives. The meeting produced a dec- laration condemning the violence and the targeting of civilians. However, the momentum that was gained by this meeting was short- lived as the government refused to continue the process and hampered a parliamentary debate on the issue. The Ugandan government has publicly stated that it will negotiate, but has shown little commitment to pursuing talks and has relied instead on military force. The Acholi popu- lation and Ugandan human rights groups argue that Museveni is not truly interested in ending the war in northern Uganda because of the direct hardship inflicted on ethnic groups that supported the previous regime, which Museveni's guerilla movement overthrew in 1986. They suggest that he is only interested in seeking revenge against northern ethnic groups for their current lack of political support. In their eyes, the rebellion in the north has been used to sustain Uganda’s “no-party democracy” system and convince for- eign leaders of Museveni’s commit- ment to fighting terrorism by waging war against the LRA. The government’s efforts to fight the LRA have been characterized by a lack of mobility and professional- ism within the UPDF. Human Rights Watch and members of the Acholi population insist that UPDF troops are not interested in direct military engagement with the LRA and in protecting innocent civilians from further abductions. These same groups report that the Ugandan military has instead enlist- ed the help of militia groups to do the bulk of the fighting. Tribal mili- tia groups from Teso, known as the “Arrow Boys,” have taken it upon themselves to protect their commu- nities from LRA incursions, and have also been successful at rescuing abducted children. Proposed Solutions For nearly two decades, the Ugandan government has waged an unsuccessful war against the LRA rebel group, most of which is made up of children. Parliamentarians, religious leaders and the people themselves have called for a cease- fire, yet the Museveni-run “Move- ment” has been reluctant to negoti- ate a settlement. The Ugandan gov- ernment must be made aware that its military operations have only increased the devastation. Both LRA and Ugandan forces have tar- geted civilians, displaced persons and refugees, but it is the govern- ment that has the direct responsibili- ty for providing protection for its cit- izenry. Since capturing power in 1986, Pres. Museveni has garnered recog- nition internationally for largely putting an end to the human rights abuses of earlier governments and instituting broad economic reforms in consultation with the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and donor governments. The govern- ment has also been cited for great strides in combating HIV/AIDS and improving the country’s literacy rate. Pres. Museveni must now step forth and demonstrate statesmanship in bringing an end to the war wracking the northern part of his country and involving a large portion of its citi- zenry. If he continues to fail to resolve the conflict, he will only encourage more speculation that all he is interested in is punishing the people of northern Uganda. The war in Uganda has taken the lives of far too many innocent civil- ians. The U.S., along with the inter- national community, must continue to urge the Ugandan government to facilitate an end to the conflict in the north and to pressure the govern- ment of Sudan to cease any military support of the LRA that may still exist. Donor countries such as the United States have urged and must continue to insist that both sides develop interim arrangements for improved delivery of humanitarian relief to those in the north. Above all, it is vital that the government of Uganda work to improve relations with the Acholi population by estab- lishing a dialogue and allowing for the development of local social and political institutions. If President Museveni fails to revolve the conflict, he will only encourage more speculation that all he is interested in is punishing the people of northern Uganda.