The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2006

Hussein had weapons of mass destruc- tion and to anticipate what would happen after the war. It turned out to be right on both counts, of course, yet its counsel was ignored. Do you view that outcome as representing a politi- cization of the intelligence process? MIA: First, let me say that I’ve always been very proud of INR. Its people deserve a lot of credit for the work they do and the independent voice they maintain. The marriage of good Foreign Service officers and long-serving Civil Service profession- als with institutional memory has pro- duced good analysis over the years. I’ve felt for some time now that the ability to truly understand what’s going on in other countries is central, both to intelligence analysis and to Foreign Service work across the board. That element of understand- ing is often missing, as we have seen in Iraq. Places like that, and Iran and Afghanistan, simply do not play to our strong suits. Another looming prob- lem is that ever since 9/11, we’ve been understandably so focused on terrorist threats that we may be losing the ana- lytical ability to look long term and think strategically. In this connection, I’ve got a hobby horse: I believe breaking relations is one of the dumbest things we do. It is always a politically easy way. Of course, sometimes it is unavoidable. I have the view that keeping lines of communication more open and hav- ing people who might get a better understanding of what is going on are highly desirable. It would have been useful to keep an embassy in Baghdad after the Gulf War, for instance. FSJ: You have been a highly vocal critic of the Iraq War and postwar policy. More than three years on, do you see any way our intervention in Iraq can help pave the way for democ- ratization in the region? MIA: Actually, I supported the move to oust Saddam Hussein. But I J U LY- A U G U S T 2 0 0 6 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 35