The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2007

because it was clear that the Soviet Union, when it reached “atomic plenty,” would be able to inflict massive damage on the United States. Launching an attack on Chinese nuclear facilities, possibly in cahoots with the Soviet Union, was seri- ously discussed during the Ken- nedy and Johnson administra- tions. The Clinton administra- tion gave thought to an attack on North Korean nuclear facili- ties. Yet each American presi- dent decided against preven- tive war. Diplomacy, and time, eventually became the preferred tools of Washington policymakers from both parties in the effort to control proliferation. The one major exception to that approach, of course, was the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which the current admin- istration justified on the basis that Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons. The subsequent debunk- ing of that rationale, coupled with the catastrophic results of our intervention, underscored what previous American presidents had concluded, and all the world now sees: preventive war has very limited utility as a nonproliferation tool. It is not likely to be used for that purpose again anytime soon. Can America Make a Difference? The Bush administration’s nuclear policies have followed a neoconservative prescription, centered on the proposition that neither the United States nor other current nuclear weapon states have any obligation to scale back their arsenals to levels lower than they have unilaterally determined they need. In fact, agreements that limit the freedom of choice of the United States and other democracies in military matters are held to be dangerous and should be avoided. In line with this logic, the Bush administration has consistently played down the idea of linkage between the levels of nuclear forces held by the United States and decisions made by other nations regarding acquisi- tion of nuclear weapons. In Washington’s view, global agreements have little effect on what governments actu- ally do; instead, regional considerations dictate major defense decisions. It is true that regional rival- ries drive arms buildups, but that is not the whole of the story. The exercise of American power and influence, by itself, cannot stop nuclear prolifera- tion, but it can help to create a climate of international opinion in which rolling back nuclear weapons programs and capabil- ities is a realistic option. There is good reason to believe that a mix of pressure and incentives can work. Ameri- can pressure on Brazil — and on Germany, which was providing it with technical sup- port — stopped a full fuel-cycle program from being activated there during the Carter administration. American pressure on Kazakhstan and Ukraine during the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations led these countries to accede to the NPT and send nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantling. South Korea, too, had a nascent nuclear weapons program until it was abandoned under U.S. pressure. As such examples demonstrate, our influence has made a difference. But to have any chance of success today, a renewed American campaign to reverse the trend toward more nuclear weapons in more hands must be backed by an indisputable commitment to reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in world affairs. Otherwise, it lacks legitimacy and is unconvincing. Re-examining Nonproliferation Strategy The Bush administration’s conceptual contributions to counterproliferation — its preferred description of its goal — have mainly addressed denial of access to, and interdiction of, nuclear materials. It has had some successes — the Libyan decision to renounce major weapons programs, for example. But the administra- tion’s overall policies have had the pernicious effect of actually encouraging nuclear proliferation. The administration tacitly acknowledges that it has adopted a selective counterproliferation policy. In sim- ple terms, the “good guys” are entitled to have nuclear weapons while the “bad guys” are not. For the good guys, there are no sanctions for proliferation; in fact, there are rewards for acquiring nuclear weapons, as the F O C U S 20 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U LY- A U G U S T 2 0 0 7 The Bush administration tacitly acknowledges that it has adopted a selective counterproliferation policy: the “good guys” are entitled to have nuclear weapons, while the “bad guys” are not.