The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2007

case of India shows. Conversely, for the bad guys the obvious enmity of the United States, coupled with the stigmas of disrespect and inequality, represent incen- tives to acquire nuclear weapons. The cases of Iran and Iraq should be warnings against such cronyism in nuclear matters. Three decades ago, the West supported Iran’s nuclear aspirations when Shah Pahlevi was in charge, and helped create the very pro- gram it now opposes. Later, Washington furnished Sad- dam Hussein with intelligence information while he was fighting a war with Iran and secretly trying to develop his own weapons of mass destruction. The next administration will have to re-examine this strategy, and consider alternative options. It could: • Explicitly endorse the selective approach that the current administration has adopted (i.e., focus only on preventing hostile nations from acquiring nuclear weapons), or • Accept that nuclear proliferation by some states, both friendly and hostile to the United States, is inevitable, and essentially give up the struggle to prevent it (or, at least, give it a low priority among our national interests), or • Strike a new deal between the nuclear “haves” and the “have-nots,” recognizing that the status quo is clearly not working. There is a rational argument in favor of both the first two strategies. U.S. influence has limits, and prolifera- tion issues must contend with other national security interests for priority. (This is the thinking behind the Bush administration’s civilian nuclear deal with India, for instance.) But their common, and fatal, defect is that they offer no way to avoid an increasingly nuclear-armed world. Complacency regarding the consequences of such a development is as unwise as it is dangerous. The military consequences alone would be daunting. The predictability that has been built into the interna- tional system will give way to increasing uncertainty and worst-case assumptions. Loss of control over atomic weapons by unstable governments, or their deliberate F O C U S J U LY- A U G U S T 2 0 0 7 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 21