The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2007

Offer Incentives for Compliance A key component of the new contract would be a determined effort to guarantee fuel supplies to those nations that agree to forgo the complete nuclear fuel cycle. This may have to be sup- ported by other incentives, such as security guarantees and alternative energy supplies. It certainly will have to be accom- panied by a means of disposing of spent fuel, a problem that no one has yet solved satisfactorily. This package is essential to the whole contract, because nations like Iran and North Korea must be sat- isfied with nuclear fuel arrangements as part of their agreement to give up nuclear weapons programs. The International Atomic Energy Agency has this under urgent review. Approaches to this problem include a fuel bank managed by the IAEA, and multilaterally owned and operated uranium enrichment and plutoni- um reprocessing facilities. Solutions to the spent fuel problem have been proposed by several private entre- preneurs and by the Bush administration via its Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. A new global nonproliferation contract can do part of the job, but any U.S. nonproliferation policy review must also focus on regional issues. In the cases of both North Korea and Iran, it is likely that a serious and persistent U.S. diplomatic offensive could affect the outcome. The key is a comprehensive approach to security issues, not one that focuses narrowly on nuclear weapons programs. Most Korea-watchers believe that Washington has not negotiated seriously with Pyongyang since 2000, so they are encouraged by recent moves to overcome the impasse, which envis- ages a comprehensive political settlement in Northeast Asia. (See “Turnabout Is Fair Play,” p. 30.) Similarly, there are probably a few years remaining before Iran will be in a position to build a nuclear weapon. The United States can and should use this time to change the nature of its relationship with Tehran. The stakes are very high. If the nuclear weapons programs of these two countries cannot be limited or stopped, the presumption must be that nuclear proliferation will accelerate around the rim of Asia, and elsewhere. The Real Challenge It is true that U.S. nonprolif- eration diplomacy has not achieved all that it was poten- tially capable of achieving. Unfortunately, issues that seem to be more urgent frequently push nonproliferation to the bottom of the agenda. For instance, the perceived need to retain Pakistan’s sup- port in fighting terrorists has overwhelmed other con- cerns. Similarly, the perceived need to cultivate India as a strategic counterweight to China has trumped nonproliferation goals. Sometimes, disagreement over how to achieve non- proliferation goals has created policy paralysis. For most of the current administration, Vice President Cheney and his allies have seen regime change as the basic answer in Iraq, Iran and North Korea, often overruling those who favor engagement. Those were the years the locusts ate, precious time lost in prevent- ing nuclear proliferation. If U.S. nonproliferation policy is to be successful, it will have to enjoy a consistently high priority, and not be shunted aside whenever a passing crisis erupts. American public opinion is supportive of an inter- nationalist policy, including partnership with other countries. Poll after poll shows this. But because those opinions are not held intensely, no politician need ever fear punishment for what he or she does or does not do about foreign policy issues. And except in the case of war, as we are now seeing in Iraq, it is rare that any sizable percentage of the American people identify any foreign policy issue as among the most important the nation faces. Given all the other issues that clamor for attention, our leaders — Republicans and Democrats alike — are not likely to urge an all-out diplomatic offensive against nuclear proliferation. It will probably not hap- pen until we Americans fight as hard for it as we do for domestic priorities. But is not the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons worth the effort? F O C U S 24 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U LY- A U G U S T 2 0 0 7 Ever since 1945, the U.S. government has recognized that in the arena of nuclear weapons, it has no permanent friends — only permanent interests.