The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2007

deeply committed to peaceful, diplomatic and multilater- al methods. We have also led the way in finding innovative approaches to using key institutions such as the Security Council. Resolution 1540, for instance, which requires all states to prohibit and prevent WMD proliferation, insti- tute effective export controls and enhance security for nuclear materials in their territory, represents another example of effective multilateralism. Built upon the Council’s authority under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, this resolution — like its predecessor, Resolution 1373, which is structured similarly but aimed at terrorism — can powerfully complement the full range of options. The United States has also lent enthusiastic direct support to the IAEA safeguards system, both through voluntary contributions and diplomatic efforts. We have promoted universal adherence to the IAEA’s Additional Protocols, which strengthen the ability of the agency’s inspectors to detect undeclared nuclear activities. In addition, we proposed the creation of the Committee on Safeguards and Verification, a new insti- tution dedicated to finding ways to improve the IAEA safeguards system. New Initiatives The United States has also developed new approaches to advancing nonproliferation goals. The Proliferation Security Initiative, for instance, has been instrumental in increasing the costs and risks to proliferators without set- ting up yet another international bureaucracy. It has enhanced nonproliferation, counterproliferation, compli- ance enforcement and deterrence by improving coordina- tion in the employment of existing national and interna- tional authorities. It is truly a new model of multilateral cooperation based upon shared interests and perspectives and an informal, flexible mode of implementation. There have been more PSI successes than one can dis- cuss publicly, but a key one was the October 2003 inter- diction of a shipment of illicit centrifuge equipment bound for Libya. That action began the unraveling of the infa- mous A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network and helped catalyze Tripoli’s pathbreaking final decision two months later to renounce the pursuit of weapons of mass destruc- tion and dismantle its WMD programs. We then worked with our British allies to enable Libya to eliminate its weapons development and long-range missile programs. This unprecedented success is a prime example of our commitment to nonproliferation and counterproliferation goals. It represents an historic example of a full-scale “rollback” of active WMD-related programs that did not occur within the context of regime change. Coming after years of deep isolation growing out of the international community’s concern about the Qadhafi regime’s support for terrorism, human rights abuses and interest in weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, Libya’s return to the international community illustrates how rela- tions with a rogue proliferator can be turned around by policies that induce it to make a wise strategic decision to abandon the pursuit of WMD. Today, as Tripoli increas- ingly reaps the benefits that naturally accrue from having a more normalized relationship with the major powers, that example is one from which rogue states such as Iran and North Korea should learn. Finally, the United States has sought to apply all the elements of our own national power to combat WMD proliferation. Our multifaceted effort has encompassed the imposition of economic sanctions against proliferator entities pursuant to U.S. laws and executive orders, as well as the investment of billions of dollars to remove nuclear warheads and proliferation-sensitive materials from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. That has helped draw down the former Soviet strategic arsenal, improve securi- ty for nuclear materials and prevent illicit transfers of WMD-related goods and materials. In addition, we are taking steps to shape the incentive structure facing proliferators around the world by devel- oping missile defenses, both on our own and in coopera- tion with friends and allies around the world. This is an important nonproliferation step, inasmuch as the purpose of these efforts is not only to defeat rogue states’ missile attacks should they occur, but also to deter proliferation by making it clear to would-be proliferators that they may not be able to deliver their weapons by means of ballistic mis- siles — and that they should therefore reconsider the pur- suit of such capabilities. Missile defenses are an impor- tant component of the world’s nonproliferation toolkit. In the context of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime, the United States has sought to shape the calcu- lations and influence the behavior of both current and F O C U S 26 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U LY- A U G U S T 2 0 0 7 Christopher A. Ford has been the U.S. special represen- tative for nuclear nonproliferation since 2006. He previ- ously served as principal deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation.