The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2007

That is the key to the next phase of negotiations. The most urgent need is to restore inspectors’ control over the North’s reprocessed plutonium, in whatever form it now exists. Assuring a verifiable halt to the uranium enrichment program is not as pressing, because U.S. intelligence esti- mates that the North cannot produce much highly enriched uranium until the end of the decade. Pyongyang had offered to put some plutonium back under inspection in an earlier round of the Six-Party Talks, but what recipro- cal U.S. steps it may want in return are not yet clear. A critical first step to addressing enrichment will be what the IAEA calls an initial declaration from Pyong- yang, a list of all its nuclear facilities, fissile material, equipment and components. The Feb. 13 accord pro- vides for the list to be “discussed” — negotiated — start- ing in the initial phase, with a complete declaration due in the next phase. Once that list is cross-checked against what U.S. intel- ligence has already ascertained, elimination could begin. Irreconcilables may try to use the declaration to play “gotcha,” seizing on any omissions as conclusive evidence of North Korean cheating and grounds for breaking off talks. Because that would put the plutonium freeze in jeopardy, it would be preferable to seek further clarifica- tion in negotiations. Inasmuch as dismantling a nuclear reactor can take years, the joint agreement speaks of “disabling” all existing nuclear facilities in the next phase. Disabling the reactor and reprocessing plant could make it time-consuming and difficult for the North to resume their operation. Disarming Strangers What are the U.S. terms of trade for the declaration and the disabling? The Feb. 13 joint statement cites two steps to improve relations: “advance the process of termi- nating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act” to the North and “begin the process of removing the des- ignation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism.” As Bush administration officials have testified, North Korea has not been implicated in any known acts of ter- rorism since 1987. However, it still harbors aging Japanese Red Army Faction terrorists who hijacked an airplane in 1970, though it has tried to repatriate them to Tokyo with- out success. More importantly, the whereabouts of Japanese citizens abducted in the 1970s have not been adequately accounted for. Thus, removing the designation without some resolution of that issue could harmU.S. rela- tions with Tokyo. In any case, Washington has many ways to relax sanc- tions and could simply put the North in the “not fully cooperating” category on terrorism. But Pyongyang will likely insist on full removal in order to isolate Japan and push it to resume negotiating in earnest. If Tokyo does not do so, Pyongyang can raise the stakes by conducting more missile tests, perhaps of its new IRBM. Another way of demonstrating non-hostile intent is for the United States to provide direct aid. The Feb. 13 accord links the “complete declaration” and disabling of the reac- tors to receipt of “economic, energy and humanitarian assis- tance up to the equivalent of one million tons of heavy fuel oil.” Although the North allowed South Korea to supply an initial shipment of heavy fuel oil, it will insist on U.S. partic- ipation in future energy aid. Further steps will doubtless require much more sub- stantial improvement in relations with the United States. The DPRK seeks full diplomatic recognition, but U.S. pol- icy dating back to the Clinton administration conditions formal ties on the resolution of other issues, among them the North’s missile programs and human rights. In the meantime, there are other ways to provide at least a token form of recognition. The Sept. 19, 2005, joint statement suggests one: negotiating “a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.” President Bush has held out the possibility of signing a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War, once the North eliminates its nuclear programs. Politically, that would be a major step to improve relations. Militarily, however, a peace treaty would hardly be worth the paper it is written on unless it reduced the risk of inadvertent war on the peninsula. The only way to accomplish that is to get rid of the North’s forward-deployed artillery and short-range missiles or redeploy them out of range of Seoul. That is unlikely if the North were to eliminate its nuclear arms, leaving the forward-deployed artillery and short-range missiles as its ultimate deterrent. As an interim step to a peace treaty, peace agreements, though militarily less meaningful, may be a politically use- ful way to proceed. Such agreements signed by the United States, the DPRK and the ROK — the three countries with armed forces on the peninsula — could provide for confidence-building measures, like hot lines to link mili- tary commands, advanced notice of exercises or an “open skies” arrangement allowing reconnaissance flights. The North has long sought replacement of the Military F O C U S 34 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U LY- A U G U S T 2 0 0 7