The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2007

with radioactive materials spread around.” In addition, Gottemoel- ler says that Russia finds it difficult to lock up radiological materials, because they are used for medical and industrial purposes in thou- sands of locations. Why Hasn’t Disaster Struck? Given the abundant nuclear material scattered around the for- mer Soviet Union and the danger- ous people who’d like to get their hands on it, it’s logical to ask, “Why haven’t we seen a nuclear 9/11 yet, either in Russia or the West?” The answer, says Bunn, lies partially in the practical difficulties. Potential thieves most likely are afraid of get- ting tricked or cheated by their partners in crime. And, of course, there’s always a risk of getting caught. The Russian federal security police, the FSB, have established a stronger presence than in years past. It’s also hard to make the connection with the end-user: “There’s no 1- 800-Osama number you can call.” Beyond that, he notes, “The world owes a great debt to the patriotism and dedication of the Russians who have been in the nuclear industry.” Through months and years of economic turmoil, infrastructure decay and payless paydays, the scientists and engineers have, for the most part, kept their dangerous charge out of the wrong hands. And while democratic freedoms have waned under Putin, the re-establishment of strict order is good for nuclear safety. So is the fact that security forces and nuclear sci- entists are getting paid regularly, which was often not true in the 1990s. Another enormously important factor has been the assistance and active intervention from the United States and other Western countries. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program has helped Russia and other states make rapid and valuable strides toward securing their at- risk materials and facilities. Cooperating to Reduce the Threat The United States began taking this issue seriously in 1992, shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Two senior senators, Sam Nunn, D-Ga., and Richard Lugar, R-Ind., joined together to sponsor the bipartisan bill that has become the cornerstone of U.S. efforts to reduce the prolifer- ation threat in the former Soviet Union. Most observers believe that Nunn-Lugar and related pro- grams have been one of the smart- est, most cost-effective approach- es to protecting U.S. security devised in recent decades. (Note: The terms “Nunn-Lugar” and “Cooperative Threat Reduction” officially apply only to Defense Department programs, though they are often used more broadly.) At present, three U.S. Cabinet departments have sig- nificant roles in counterproliferation efforts. The Department of Defense has worked principally with the Russian Ministry of Defense on weapons-related threats. The Department of Energy, including its National Nuclear Security Agency, has worked both with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (known as Rosatom) and its defense ministry. The State Department has sup- ported a range of programs, including export controls and re-employment for thousands of Russian nuclear special- ists whose skills could otherwise be used in unfortunate ways. In all, there have been dozens of cooperative non- proliferation programs sponsored by the United States over the last 15 years. In part, the programs have been successful because the Russian government has taken the risk seriously and been willing to accept advice and technical assistance from its former adversary. Gottemoeller notes that the Russians have allowed U.S. personnel into “sites that, in the Cold War years, we would never have gotten within 100 miles of. They have taken some risks, in a national policy sense, in letting foreigners become involved in protecting their nuclear materials and their warheads.” She adds that this year, “We are completing the work with the Russian Navy, including warhead storage sites. [And] there are ongoing projects with the Strategic Rocket Forces and with the Russian Air Force.” Interestingly, the cooperative threat reduction pro- gram continues, even when there are rough patches in other aspects of our relations with Moscow. “Even now, which is a very bad time in the U.S.-Russian relationship, they are continuing to support the cooperation,” Got- F O C U S 40 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U LY- A U G U S T 2 0 0 7 After 15 years of progress in Russia, the counterproliferation experts and pursestring holders are moving on to other challenges.