The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2008

between the administration and non-government analysts that reliance on Pakistani territory as a safe harbor and recruiting base constitutes a critical advantage for the Taliban and its allies, though divisions remain over how to address this problem. Some call for a much stronger U.S. role, possibly to include assumption of command in south- ern Afghanistan, where the Taliban is strongest. There is also sharp disagreement over how to address Taliban bas- ing and logistics operations in Pakistan. Proposals range from assertive U.S./NATO action that is less constrained by concerns of Pakistani sovereignty to a willingness to give Islamabad time to negotiate with local leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Swat, a district in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province. There has been much less debate, however, on recom- mendations related to the non-security aspects of policy — namely, development and governance. The attempt to centralize leadership of economic efforts under a develop- ment czar was generally supported in the international community but resisted by some Afghans. In any event, progress in development and, to a lesser extent, effective governance remains hostage to progress in improving the security environment. Ironically, effective governance is perceived as a matter that falls more exclusively within the Afghan purview— despite the reality that the central gov- ernment functions within a framework created by the international community at the 2001 Bonn conference. Forgetting History While the international community and, in particular, the U.S., are to be faulted for paying insufficient attention over the long term to Afghanistan, the troubled nation’s leaders also bear considerable responsibility for the fail- ures of recent years. Today, even where the central gov- ernment does exercise influence, too often Kabul-appoint- ed officials are corrupt or incompetent or, in some places, operate at cross purposes with the government. The police and judiciary are broadly ineffective and have caused great popular disaffection. There is no effective civil service throughout much of Afghanistan; both the Public Service F O C U S J U LY- A U G U S T 2 0 0 8 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 25