The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2008

of government — notwithstanding the fragile alliance of multiple, competing interests on which the new regime was to be based. Centralization Backfires As per the Bonn process, the Karzai administration has pursued a central- ized economic policy, centrally control- ling justice, health and educational services as well. The 2004 constitution further entrenched this presidential system. Its framework was an outgrowth of a Decem- ber 2003 national meeting (loya jirga) that convened and deliberated under international influence. That meeting was not, however, organized along tra- ditional lines. According to custom, the assembly should have given voice to genuine tribal and other local leaders, intellectual and cultural leaders and religious personages. Instead, its membership consisted largely of military and political figures who had been empowered by the anti- Soviet jihad. Many of these figures owed their promi- nence to foreign support, and more than a few were cor- rupt, brutal warlords whose power was based on their capacity to inspire fear rather than respect among Afghans. The new governance system has also created an envi- ronment of intensely personalized politics, generating a court of supplicants that has enervated Karzai’s presiden- cy and tarnished it with a reputation of corruption and incompetence. The appointment of officials (provincial governors and police officials, who are often warlords or militia commanders) is largely based on political patron- age, leaving local communities hostage to political deal- making in Kabul. The national parliament is another matter. Its election in 2005 drew a low turnout, in part because of poor administration of the election. Voter and candidate intimidation, a confusing system for casting ballots and a field of candidates that included notorious warlords and criminals also severely diminished voter interest. The elections produced a mixed result. While women are relatively well represented, the parliament also includes many figures against whom there are credible allega- tions of human rights abuses and other criminal activity. These include major figures from the seven tanzims, the mujahedeen parties developed in the 1980s under the aegis of Islamabad and Washington. Parliamentarians need not be literate, and many are not. This, along with the relative lack of a meaningful parliamentary role in a system heavily weighted toward the executive, has limited the power and influence of the legislature, which in any event has been highly fractious and frequently undemocratic. But, rather than strengthening Karzai, the presidential system established under this new constitution has tended to make him a lightning rod for the failures of both his regime and the international community to fulfill their promises to the Afghan people. Though he retains their sympathy — Afghans turned out in large numbers in 2004 to elect him — Pres. Karzai is increasingly seen as well-meaning but feckless. Looking Ahead The fall 2009 presidential election, if not precluded by security problems, and the parliamentary election to fol- low in 2010 could provide opportunities for new leader- ship under a new governance formula. It is unlikely, however, that simply a new mandate for Karzai or selection of a successor would significantly change the structural problems that have hobbled Afghanistan over the past three years. Nor is it likely that the composition of the legislature would change significantly, given the fact that members have for the most part used their tenure since 2005 to entrench themselves. Although time is short, consideration should be given to convening a new loya jirga along traditional lines — namely, drawing in genuine leadership from tribal and ethnic groups, intellectuals and religious leaders. The aims of this gathering would be to reconsider the struc- ture of government bequeathed to the Afghan nation by the 2001 Bonn process and to renew popular hope by drawing on the lessons of successful and authentic Afghan experience. There is reason to expect a new loya jirga could yield better results than the 2001 process, which took place under exceedingly difficult circumstances. It was neces- sary to find unity among Afghan participants who agreed on little more than their common opposition to the Taliban. Ethnic and tribal enmity, the tragic loss of key potential leaders and ideological differences presented international mediators with great challenges. Compet- F O C U S 28 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U LY- A U G U S T 2 0 0 8 The 2004 constitution further entrenched the centralized, presidential system.