The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2008

order is a barrier to change, educa- tion, economic betterment and hu- man rights. We cannot defeat this tactic by combat power alone. Instead, we have capitalized on our asymmetric advantage, the ability to offer both a better today and a better tomorrow. The United States is the largest donor to Afghanistan, carrying out com- prehensive sector programs in agri- culture and alternative development, infrastructure (roads and power), health, education, economic growth, good governance and the rule of law. In 2001, fewer than one million boys and no girls attended school in Afghanistan. Now, six million children (40 percent of them girls) regularly go to school. Infant mortality has been slashed. Eighty percent of all Afghans now have access to medical care. Licit exports have increased nearly 600 percent. The extent of paved or improved roads has been doubled to 40,000 kilometers. Each road brings development and stability: as the say- ing goes, “Where the roads end, the Taliban begins.” While worthwhile, it is a tremendous effort that often seems to proceed at a glacial pace. We are not alone in this fight. In addition to NATO/ ISAF, the U.N., the Red Cross and a slew of nongovern- mental organizations are on the ground. Unfortunately, however, many of these entities approach the complex Afghan environment the same way they have a dozen other conflict zones, regardless of whether their methods are appropriate or effective under the circumstances. Seeing this, the United States decided that a new approach was needed, and thus the Provincial Reconstruction Team concept was born. A Unique Institution Since their inception, PRTs have proven effective in supporting the spread of governance and development in Afghanistan. The first PRT was stood up in Paktia province in a traditional mud compound in 2002. Since then, 25 additional teams (11 U.S.-led and 14 non-U.S.) have been deployed throughout the country, mostly on small Forward Operating Bases located in provincial cap- itals. The U.S.-led teams combine civilian and military personnel who focus on governance, development and security. These civil-military teams work with the Afghan government, civil society, Afghan and coalition secu- rity forces, and the international community. Because the country’s provinces differ greatly in terms of ethnic and tribal mix, level of secu- rity and economic development, there can be no “cookie cutter” approach. That said, each PRT has a similar mandate: to extend the reach of the Afghan government, carry out reconstruc- tion projects and help build up local security forces. Ten of the 12 U.S. PRTs are located in Regional Command East under the control of Combined Joint Task Force 101. The 101st also commands U.S. and coalition combat forces within its area of responsibility. Subordinate brigades coordinate the actions of both the PRTs and the combat units. It should be emphasized, however, that the PRTs are separate entities from the combat, or “maneuver” units. The PRTs have national identities, as well. Eleven of the 12 U.S. PRTs are military-led and have a handful of civilian officers — one each from State, USAID and USDA. The civilians are equal members of the PRT’s integrated command team. The military commander has final authority on all security matters, but the civilians take the lead on governance and development. By con- trast, some non-U.S. PRTs are led by senior civilians with a sizable non-military staff, or by the military with civilian development advisers from the host country. There are also philosophical differences. U.S. PRTs are integrated civil-military counterinsurgency units. Other nations view PRTs either as development agencies with a military component for security, or as agencies that only provide security training. We believe that the U.S. model is the most effective, and some of our allies seem to be coming around to this view. There is a growing recognition by our British and Canadian colleagues (among others) that “the Americans seem to have caught on to something.” The integration of non-military personnel is one of the major differences between the American effort and those of our allies. While other nations also assign civilians to their PRTs, the two sides often operate in virtual isolation from each other. In some non-U.S. PRTs, the relation- ship between them borders on hostility. In contrast, vis- F O C U S 32 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U LY- A U G U S T 2 0 0 8 The integration of civilians is one of the major differences between the American effort and those of our allies.