The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2008

Durand Line broke the region’s dominant Pashtun ethnic group in two, creating a Pashtun-majority Afghanistan and assigning a large portion of the Pashtun-populated areas to what was then British India. Kabul refuses to recognize such a border and maintains a longstanding claim to the Pashtun territories within Pakistan (the North West Frontier Province, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and parts of Baluchistan). Islamabad, for its part, denounces Afghan claims as unac- ceptable: not only would they deprive Pakistan of part of its territory, but could also open a Pandora’s box of competing ethnic identities and nationalisms. This so-called “Pashtunistan issue” becomes even more crucial for Islamabad when seen within the context of the larger South Asian security complex, in particular Pakistan-India relations. Since partition of the subconti- nent in 1947, the disputed Kashmir border has been the source of three wars and nearly uninterrupted tension between Pakistan and its larger neighbor. The perceived threat from India has been an important driver of Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan. New Delhi enjoyed good relations with all Afghan gov- ernments, irrespective of their political affiliations, from 1947 until the fall of the Burhanuddin Rabbani govern- ment in September 1996. In light of this, from 1947 to 1979 Pakistan was essentially on the defensive, and rela- tions between Islamabad and Kabul experienced several severe crises. Diplomatic relations were even severed for a brief period, and were resumed only when the shah of Iran mediated a rapprochement. In 1979, however, the Soviet invasion provided Islamabad with an opportunity to reverse Afghan claims to the Pashtun territories inside Pakistan and, with the sup- port of the international community, try to install a more friendly government in Kabul. Thus, as part and parcel of the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, began Islamabad’s use of the border region for asymmetric warfare, the preference given to the Pashtun resistance groups and later, in the vacuum left after the Soviets’ 1989 defeat, Pakistan’s support to the Taliban. In 1996, when the Taliban assumed power in Kabul, and India declined to recognize the new government, Delhi’s influence was marginalized. But after the Taliban’s overthrow in 2001 and India’s return to the Afghan scene, Pakistan began to fear that New Delhi’s renewed pres- ence would reactivate the Afghan claim to “Greater Pashtunistan.” Islamabad and New Delhi soon began trading accusa- tions of sabotage and terrorism. Pakistan, in particular, accused India of fomenting trouble in Waziristan and Baluchistan from its consulates placed along the border and of placing troops in Afghanistan. As late as July 2006, fully five years after the formation of the International Security Assistance Force, the Pakistani press was still speaking of “unconfirmed reports” that New Delhi was ready to send troops to join the peacekeeping effort in Afghanistan at the request of the U.S., NATO and the European Union. If the rhetoric about the Indian consulates in Afghanistan and their supposed role in covert destabiliza- tion operations in Pakistan has diminished, the mistrust between the two countries persists. Given Islamabad’s continued refusal to grant India the transit rights that would allow Afghanistan to benefit from trade and assis- tance from India, it is reasonable to assume that Pakistan is not ready to accept an Indian presence on both its west- ern and eastern borders. The U.S. Factor Ironically, the continuation of a U.S. role and, more generally, an international presence in Afghanistan is a major Pakistani objective. And this helps explain Islama- bad’s continued support of the Taliban. Because it was never able to secure automatic American protection in case of a conflict with India and is, moreover, convinced that the U.S. will leave Afghanistan as soon as the situation allows, Pakistan has to preserve its status as a front-line state for as long as possible, while at the same time mini- mizing the risks inherent in such a situation. Perpetuation of a low-intensity conflict in Afghanistan, coupled with maintenance of indigenous Pakistani terror- ist organizations with an international reach, gives Islamabad long-term bargaining power with the U.S. and its allies. As long as American and NATO forces are pre- sent in Afghanistan, no regional power, in particular India, can develop a significant influence in the country. This is not Pakistan’s sole motivation; nor does it make Islamabad the only party responsible for the current impasse in Afghanistan. It is, nevertheless, an obvious consequence of Pakistan’s involvement in Afghan affairs and part of Islamabad’s strategic calculations in the region. Washington’s attempts to promote confidence-building measures between Pakistan and Afghanistan — in partic- ular, the Tripartite Commission, composed of senior mili- F O C U S 42 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U LY- A U G U S T 2 0 0 8