The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2008

Center, that the TTP is bound to refocus on Afghanistan “if and when its position strengthens in the FATA and the NWFP.” The real question is whether the ongoing insurgency in Pakistan will convince its military and intelligence author- ities to renounce their support for the Taliban in Afghanistan. The militants have now clearly turned to attacks against domestic military organizations. As Abbas notes, “of the 56 suicide bombings in Pakistan in 2007, 36 were against military related targets, including two against the ISI; two against the army headquarters in Rawalpindi; one aimed at the air force in Sargodha; and one directed at the facility of the Special Service Group in Tarbela.” Yet Pakistan seems to be still supporting the Quetta Shura — the Afghan Taliban’s most important leadership council, headed by Mullah Omar — as well as its traditional pro- tégés such as the Haqqani family (Jallaluddin and his son Sirajuddin) and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Mullah Omar himself has highlighted divergences between the two movements, saying that the struggle was in Afghanistan, not in Pakistan. Though partially overlap- ping, the two insurgencies are clearly going in different directions: one is targeting Pakistan or, more precisely, army units suspected to have been involved in the July 2007 assault against the militants who had found refuge in the Red Mosque in Islamabad; the other is targeting Afghanistan. There is every reason to believe that if elim- inating the former has at last become a priority for the Pakistani military, the latter is still considered legitimate and worth supporting. Potential Impact of the Pakistani Elections In this context, the results of the March Pakistani elec- tions could have a significant impact. They brought to power the Pakistan People’s Party in Islamabad and the Awami National Party in the NWFP, a Pashtun-majority province bordering Afghanistan. Both organizations were cooperating even before the elections to bring about a pos- itive change in relations between the two countries. The late former Pakistan prime minister and PPP chief Benazir Bhutto had met Pres. Karzai only a few hours before she was murdered; and ANP leader Afsandyar Wali Khan maintains excellent relationships with the Af- ghan leadership. Most mainstream political parties, including the PPP and the ANP, focused their electoral campaign on the maintenance of peace and gained a clear popular mandate on that basis. They will, however, be constrained on two sides. Peace has been understood by the electorate as a rejection of Musharraf and his allies’ strategies. But the U.S. is unlike- ly to accept any deals like those made by the Pakistani president between 2004 and 2006, which led to the con- solidation and strengthening of the Taliban in the FATA. Eliminating al-Qaida and its allies remains an American priority, so the new Pakistani government risks facing con- siderable pressure from Washington if its policies fail to deliver on this front. The second difficulty will be related to the evolution of civil-military relations in Pakistan itself. Although the pre- sent chief of army staff, General Pervez Kiyani, observed a surprising neutrality in the February elections — indi- cating an interest in restoring the military’s public image and professionalism — it remains unclear whether he is ready to accept a more decisive role in the definition of Pakistan’s national interest and the formulation of its secu- rity policies. More specifically, though he seems willing to combat terrorism on Pakistan’s soil, it remains unclear whether he will also be willing to stop Islamabad’s support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, which he previously orches- trated as director general of the ISI. In short, there is a total asymmetry of priorities among the three main actors on the Pakistani side of the equation. The political parties want a normalization of relations with Afghanistan, are willing to bring peace to the area and, reflecting the views of the electorate, do not necessarily see the fight against al-Qaida as a priority. For the U.S., by contrast, eliminating that group prevails over every other consideration. Despite official rhetoric, even stability in Afghanistan is secondary to this primary focus; or, more precisely, stability in Afghanistan is important only to the extent that it is a precondition to preclude its becoming again a sanctuary for al-Qaida. Finally, the Pakistan Army wants a degree of normalization with Afghanistan, but is not necessarily ready to renounce the means of pressure on the Afghan government that the Taliban constitutes. It also sees the fight against al-Qaida essentially as a means to buy Western good will. The outcome will depend on the compromises reached among these three actors. The various statements by the new Pakistani government announcing that the border fight against the Taliban will continue certainly reflect a realization that there is no going back as far as the Pakistani Taliban is concerned. But that is not an indication that Pakistan will change its strategy in Afghanistan itself. F O C U S 44 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U LY- A U G U S T 2 0 0 8