The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2008

authority and against the advice of almost all his colleagues to go to Moscow to negotiate with the Krem- lin. He was warmly welcomed by Brezhnev, who used Svoboda’s pres- ence to convince thousands of Rus- sians watching their caravan come up Leninskiy Prospekt in Moscow that Soviet forces had rescued socialism from its enemies. Svoboda returned to Prague on Aug. 27, bringing back the kidnapped leaders but also a bilateral “agree- ment” that was immediately recog- nized by a shocked country as total capitulation. Dubcek, having con- vinced himself that he could help stave off the worst, became a reluctant col- laborator in a process known as “nor- malization.” Josef Smrkovsky, now chairman of the Czechoslovak Parlia- ment, told the truth to the end, argu- ing for Czechoslovak national unity — but the Soviets saw this as a code name for resistance. They isolated and ultimately disposed of him. It nevertheless required a provoca- tion adroitly organized by the Czech Ministry of the Interior to force the resignation of Dubcek as the last sym- bol of the Prague Spring. The Czech security forces, in conjunction with the KGB, took advantage of a huge patri- otic demonstration in the heart of Prague in late March 1969 to smash and destroy the Aeroflot and Intourist offices in Prague, an act to which I was an eyewitness. Dubcek was replaced in April, after 15 months as first secre- tary of the party, by Gustav Husak, another Slovak and a self-styled realist who had played a “Slovak card” to undermine the last vestiges of the Prague Spring. The Embassy During the Crisis Our small embassy (10 FSOs, two military attachés, a small CIA station, secretaries, communicators and Mar- ine guards) had been a main target in the gloomy second half of 1967, when its mission of building bridges to Czechoslovakia was impeded by the regime’s need to find a foreign culprit for its internal problems. Even in 1968 things were not much better, as the largely unreformed Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry — which U.S. Ambassador Jacob Beam rightly termed “mischief-making” — tried to pacify Moscow by accentuating differ- ences with the United States. Czechoslovakia continued to be the number-three purveyor of military assistance to North Vietnam and help- fully organized disruptive pro- tests around the embassy. But through quiet diplomacy, the em- bassy had nevertheless been building bridges to economic reformers, intel- lectuals and other receptive progres- sives. The informed population re- garded us as friends. The embassy covered the invasion on the streets of Prague from the first report that Soviet aircraft (250 of them, landing audibly one minute apart) were transporting troops and armor to crush the Prague Spring. We were on the street well before dawn on Aug. 21, and throughout the inva- sion, to provide the department with timely first-hand reporting on what was transpiring, particularly the mag- nificent passive resistance of the pop- ulation. Our primary obligation was to American citizens, of course. Those few embassy wives still in Prague, including mine, opened the embassy commissary to feed hungry citizens flocking there. Many were billeted by our Marines. On Aug. 22, the em- bassy organized a convoy to deliver American citizens to the West Ger- man border. Hundreds remained, however, and the Foreign Ministry was unwilling or unable to help. The airport was closed, and the main rail- way station occupied by Soviet troops. At the request of Amb. Beam, I placed a direct phone call later that day to a vice minister of transport with whom I was acquainted. By luck I got him on the line and asked for a special train to take out Americans and other foreigners. I thought he would in- quire if I knew there was a war on. Instead, he responded affirmatively but said the train would have to depart southward from an alternate station. Our stalwart consular section orga- nized the evacuation of those wishing to travel, and the train rescued hun- dreds of trapped and worried citizens and foreigners alike. Our reward came in the wee hours of Aug. 26, 1968, when we learned that the attic of the chancery —where most of us also resided — was on fire. The Prague fire department could not help because of a Soviet curfew pro- hibiting any movement by night. With the leadership of a single gallant seabee and a solitary fire hose, supple- mented by a bucket brigade up slip- pery, smoke-filled stairs, we battled for three hours in the darkness to save the chancery from destruction while our dependents waited outside, ready to evacuate the premises if necessary. Washington, Moscow and Prague The reaction of individuals at the top level of the U.S. government to 56 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U LY- A U G U S T 2 0 0 8 The reaction of individuals at the top level of the U.S. government to the August events was not a shining moment of American diplomacy.