The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2010

would not have been smart politics or conducive to good morale. As a result, the negotiations ended. Marsh was actually relieved by this turn of events and wrote Seward that, although he had cooperated in the mis- sion, he’d had serious reservations about the wisdom of enlisting Gari- baldi’s services. It is likely that such reservations concerned the general’s single-mindedness and independence once he set himself an objective. On Sept. 18, 1861, Sanford sent his own report to Seward, noting that Garibaldi had said that the only way in which he could render service “was as commander-in-chief of its forces, that he would only go as such, and with the additional contingent power — to be governed by events —of declaring the abolition of slavery.” One More Try Almost exactly one year later, Theodore Canisius (1826-1885), the U.S. consul in Vienna, would make a similar approach to Garibaldi — again without the knowledge of Lincoln or Seward. Canisius, who had been born in Germany, was a naturalized U.S. citi- zen and the publisher of a German- language newspaper, Illinois Staatz- Anzeiger , in Springfield, Ill. A secret business partner of Lincoln, he had supported his presidential candidacy by printing campaign literature in Ger- man. In September 1862, Canisius sent a letter to Garibaldi seeking to ascertain whether the general would move to the U.S. to fight for the Union. When news of this unauthorized move reach- ed Washington, Canisius was briefly fired, only to be reinstated at the re- quest of the Italian government. The misstep did not hurt his career: after remaining in Vienna until 1866, he later served as consul in Gustemunde, Germany; Bristol, England; and the Samoan Islands. Canisius’ letter reached the general at Varignano, near La Spezia, in a jail where the Italian government was de- taining him for organizing an expedi- tionary corps to liberate Rome. Just a few days before, Italian army troops had confronted and stopped Garibaldi’s group at Aspromonte, Calabria. In the skirmish, Garibaldi was wounded by a shot to the foot. Garibaldi answered Canisius, saying that he was willing to go when he was well and was freed. Garibaldi also in- formed Minister Marsh of the new ap- proach. Marsh not only interceded for Garibaldi’s freedom (which occurred on Oct. 5, 1862) but changed his mind about recruiting the general, adding his own pitch to that of Canisius. It is possible that Garibaldi, had he been in better health, would have ac- cepted a subordinate U.S. command. But the sticking point was his demand that the president declare that the principle animating the fight was the freedom of all slaves. In fact, Lincoln was already moving to accomplish that objective by issuing the Emancipation Proclamation on Jan. 1, 1863. Marsh, however, was not aware of Lincoln’s in- tentions and could not offer any assur- ances to Garibaldi. Even after the Emancipation Proclamation, Garibaldi continued to press the U.S. for the complete aboli- tion of slavery. On Aug. 6, 1863, he wrote Lincoln to assure him that “Pos- terity will call you the great emancipa- tor, a more enviable title than any crown could be, and greater than any merely mundane treasure.” What Might Have Been… Even if Garibaldi had accepted the U.S. consuls’ proposal, we can only speculate as to whether his highly per- sonal generalship, quick adaptation to changed conditions on the battlefield and superior leadership skills could have shortened the Civil War. He was a master campaigner who eschewed the doctrinal tactics of the time (massing troops shoulder-to- shoulder for direct frontal charges), preferring night attacks, swift move- ments and the disruption of the enemy’s lines of communications and supply. At the same time, Garibaldi had no experience with planning and carrying out campaigns involving hundreds of thousands of soldiers, and his strategic abilities were mostly unproven. In fact, the largest army he ever com- manded was the approximately 30,000 men who, on Sept. 7, 1860, peacefully entered Naples after King Francesco II had evacuated it. Fortunately, Lincoln would soon find his own Garibaldi in Ulysses S. Grant. ■ Even after the Emancipation Proclamation, Garibaldi continued to press the U.S. for the complete abolition of slavery. 54 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U LY- A U G U S T 2 0 1 0 Want to send a Letter to the Editor? Have something to Speak Out about? Have a contribution for In Memory ? Send it to journal@afsa.org