The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2012

24 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U LY- A U G U S T 2 0 1 2 by events. For instance, the current congressional requirement to divide funding requests between a base budget and a category known as Over- seas Contingency Operations (basi- cally, to fund our posts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan) has made it difficult to assess how much recent progress is permanent and how much is transitory. Nor do we have any sense of how temporary the OCO structure is. Current administration policy calls for a con- tinuing, if substantially reduced, military involvement in Afghanistan after the transfer of the “security lead” to local forces in 2014. This may change, but it appears likely that our nation will still be involved in stabilization operations in Afghanistan for many years. In Iraq, State’s substantial role is undisputed but its character and size may change. Thus, like its military equivalent, the “con- tingency” funding of OCO may be with us for years to come. Furthermore, many of the expanded positions in Iraq and Afghanistan are filled by temporary, contract hires. While further research is needed, it appears that eventual reductions in the size of these missions will not release more than a handful of Foreign Service positions for training or other assignments. Finally, the FAB study failed to address requirements for support staff in security, information management and office management. This makes it tricky to relate FAB requirements to accomplishments in increasing staffing. Progress and Setbacks With this in mind, AAD is now preparing a new study, Diplomacy in a Time of Scarcity, in partnership with the Stimson Center and the Una Chapman Cox Foundation. Its purpose is twofold: to determine the full gamut of staffing needed for an effective Foreign Service at State and USAID, even as the respective responsibilities of civilians and military personnel are being recalibrated, and to assess progress since the 2011 study. New chal- lenges will continue to shape staffing requirements, but that is why it is more necessary than ever to have a de- tailed and defensible vision to guide the multiyear budget process. Although the new study will only be completed in late summer or early fall of 2012, it is al- ready possible to lay out a few facts. Comparing the recommendations of 2008 with progress since then (as of late March 2012), we can draw some conclusions, although there are dif- ferences between how we formu- lated our recommendations and how State keeps its personnel records. Of the 1,099 additional positions in core diplomatic functions recommended by the FAB report, only about 500 have actually been added. Public diplomacy, very much a core component of diplomacy but one we treated separately for analytical purposes, grew by about 300 of- ficers; that constitutes satisfactory progress compared to the 487 positions we advocated be added. The FAB rec- ommendations for expansion of the stabilization function have advanced, but because that function is undergoing changes after the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Develop- ment Review, conclusions now would be premature. The FAB report did not look at consular and management of- ficers, but since 2008 these areas have increased by ap- proximately 280 and 150 officers, respectively. In round figures, then, the Foreign Service during the current administration has grown by about 1,200 officers. Less noticed is that during the same period Civil Service growth has been larger still, so that at least half (we are still working through some issues of data interpretation) of State’s growth under the much-discussed Diplomacy 3.0 program has been in the latter corps. The rationale for this distribution is one of the objects of the current study. During the same period, USAID has added nearly all 1,250 positions FAB recommended. However, we are still sorting out some aspects of how USAID’s personnel structure relates to its mission and how much of the in- crease is in development officers. Thus, we are not yet ready to declare that these numbers meet the need. In the area of training, the State Department has added nearly 700 additional positions for language in- struction — an excellent step, and more than the FAB report forecast before the demands of the Arab Spring and the expanded involvement in Afghanistan, along with some other changes, raised the requirement for officers with hard language skills. These enhancements of the Foreign Service’s ability to field staff with language skills commensurate with their F OCUS State still does too little to expand staff knowledge through career-long, systematic education.