The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2013

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JULY-AUGUST 2013 61 Statecraft Pays Off The Reagan-Gorbachev Arms Control Breakthrough: The Treaty Eliminating Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Missiles David T. Jones, editor, Vellum, 2012, $28, paperback, 412 pages. Reviewed by Douglas Kinney The six contributors to The Reagan-Gor- bachev Arms Control Breakthrough, who all worked on the INF Treaty, have col- lectively given us an insightful overview of how a seminal moment in the annals of arms control came to fruition with the 1987 treaty, which for the first time elimi- nated an entire class of nuclear delivery vehicles. As explained in this collection, skill- fully compiled and edited by retired Senior Foreign Service officer David T. Jones, the story of the INF Treaty really begins during the 1970s, when Moscow unilaterally deployed SS-20 missiles in Warsaw Pact countries. The move was intended to cow Western Europe into effective neutrality. To counter that deployment, NATO introduced INF missiles of its own. It then immediately sought agreement to phase out all ground-launched missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (roughly 300-3,300 miles). The positioning of these countervailing systems no doubt raised the strategic temperature in Europe, but the offer of a way out was adroitly presented and produced asymmetrical reductions, with more than 1,800 Soviet missiles and about 800 U.S. systems ultimately destroyed. How did the West orchestrate this diplomatic success? These essayists cite many different overlapping factors, which might be summed up as persis- tence, principled positions, power, political adroit- ness (including constant consultation with NATO allies and Congress), political courage and pluck. Moreover, the West was matched by a more enlightened Kremlin under Mikhail Gorbachev, one that faced a six- minute Pershing II flight time to Moscow and mounting socioeconomic pressures to retrench. The strategy worked precisely because it was a narrow pursuit of limited means toward limited ends in a largely bipolar world. It was, to cite a very American concept, “doable.” Impressive as it was in its own right, however, the true significance of the INF Treaty is that it paved the way for the continued “builddown” of thermonu- clear stockpiles. Over the past quarter- century, the United States has moved from about 30,000 deployed nuclear warheads to roughly 5,000. Mutual drawdowns have enhanced stability at the superpower level and bolstered arguments for less proliferation by other nuclear powers, both declared and undeclared. Breakthrough lays out a splendid example of a purposeful, muscular national security policy that pairs arms deployment with a willingness to negoti- ate reductions. As such, it is a bracing reminder that statecraft pays. Intention- ality pays. And forging coalitions that reinforce norms and agree- ments (even implicit ones) about restraint and rules of the game still conveys lever- age. Strength helps, as do prin- ciple and nuance. As Goethe observed, boldness has genius, power and magic in it. The difficulty of hammering out interagency policy posi- tions is not always a bad thing. Force of arms underpinning long-term thinking, persistence and principled positions generates maximum synergy and lever- age from our military, intelligence and diplomatic assets. In short, diplomacy works. So, too, does pushing back against deliberate disinformation. At one point, the U.S. delegation offered its Soviet counterparts a briefing on where precisely their Trans- porter Erector Launchers were deployed. Moscow declined, but the message got through. As that episode suggests, the American team shared a mix of ironic purposefulness and humor—a genuine survival skill that kept everyone sane during the interminable negotiations in Geneva. That humor is interlaced through the book, keeping the INF tale from ever getting dry. Those who worked on different stages of the INF process recently gathered for conferences and a dinner celebrating the 25th anniversary of the treaty. It was a sobering reminder of how much was at stake, as well as a humbling display of the stunning array of talent across the many elements of the national security community devoted to managing this massive, existential threat. Today, it is no doubt difficult for most of us to feel (not simply know intel- lectually) just how frigid the Cold War was, and to recall how many people in Jones’ account reminds us that the difficulty of hammering out interagency policy positions is not always a bad thing. BOOKS