The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2015

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JULY-AUGUST 2015 55 In a sense, a control mechanism has evolved within our society which is likely to prevent for the foreseeable future any repeti- tion of a Vietnam style involvement. The danger may therefore be not that we will ignore the lessons of Vietnam, but that we will be tempted to apply them too broadly, in East Asia and around the world. Nonetheless, although not all of them are universally applicable, the lessons of Vietnam are clear, and numerous: The Nature of Commitments • We must keep commitments to individual countries tailored to our degree of interest. This is not to say that the independence and well-being of small countries are of no consequence or concern for the United States—only that such considerations are relatively more consequential in areas where our interests are more directly at issue. Related to this, resources devoted to carrying out our commitments should be proportionate to the intrinsic importance of the commitment itself, or of the interest it reflects. • It follows, therefore, that we should commit ourselves only selectively to undertakings likely to involve the expenditure of lives or of massive resources. (Important note: having made commitments, we cannot be selectively reliable in fulfilling them.) • Recognizing that constancy in our commitments is impor- tant, we should nevertheless avoid confusing constancy with inertia. When circumstances change dramatically, or a com- mitment clearly becomes unsustainable, we should draw the right conclusions and change our policy accordingly. 1968 was probably a better time to try for a comprehensive political settle- ment in Vietnam than was 1972. 1973 was a better time to press the GVN [South Vietnamese government] for further realistic political negotiations—particularly since we were in that year deprived by Congress of the ability to enforce the Paris Agree- ment—than was 1974 or 1975. The Nature of Allies • Foremost among the criteria we might henceforth employ in making judgments about our commitments is the indigenous strength and will of our prospective ally—its ability to help itself. Although the Vietnamese government we supported was far more humane than its adversary, it was, in the final analysis, unable to mobilize effectively the support of its people in the face of an implacable, disciplined enemy. Without such support, ultimate defeat was probably inevitable. In our desire to stem North Vietnamese communist expansion, we underestimated this critical factor. • In effect, we allowed saving South Vietnam to become more important to us than it was for the South Vietnamese them- selves. In the future, we should gauge our support to our allies’ efforts, and their successes. If they cannot do the job, we will be unable to do it for them. • We should be fully aware of the fragility of governments which rest, to a significant degree, on the support of the mili- tary. This was not the chief cause of South Vietnam’s down- fall—indeed the GVN retained a considerable aura of legiti- macy within Vietnam—but the inflexibility and narrowness of judgment of an increasingly isolated leadership in the face of unyielding North Vietnamese pressure played a role in the nation’s ultimate collapse. • We consistently allowed the GVN to utilize massive U.S. support as a substitute for solutions to its own internal political problems. We were never willing to force the GVN to face up to this fact. The Nature of Adversaries • There are probably few prospective opponents anywhere in the world who will prove to have the determination and single-mindedness of Hanoi. Nevertheless, we consistently underestimated the tenacity and sense of purpose of Hanoi, and overestimated our ability to break its will. We applied our strength without an adequate assessment of our opponent and thus neither achieved success nor deterred his pursuit of his objectives. • Nor should we underestimate the ability of revolutionary movements to develop broad and deep-seated popular support in loosely structured, unmodern societies. Most such societ- ies have relatively recent memories of colonialism, or continue to experience various degrees of external exploitation, and are as such susceptible to revolutionary appeals to nationalistic instincts. In Vietnam, we were never able to escape being the inheritors of the French colonization. We should be fully aware of the fragility of governments which rest, to a significant degree, on the support of the military.