The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2015

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JULY-AUGUST 2015 57 tion and recommendations proceeded upward through the system, because of the pressures for success. • We should insure [ sic ] that the political and military aspects of our commitments, and the resources we devote to each, are kept in proper balance. Military considerations will become dominant in policy if that balance is skewed and, as in Vietnam, we may lose sight of the fundamental nature of the conflict and our goals in it. • We should try to insure [ sic ] that we do not become locked- in to “firefighting” management techniques. We must improve our ability to anticipate events in any situation of major Ameri- can involvement, rather than finding ourselves—as we so often did in Vietnam—coping with crises after they had arisen. Domestic Considerations • We should recognize that no amount of cajolery can create public support for a foreign undertaking where none already exists. (Thus, our commitments must be related to perceived national interests.) An administration, by active leadership, can only energize latent support. • Having become involved in a difficult foreign project, we should not attempt to mislead public opinion or the Congress as to its duration or the level of sacrifice it will require. We should not profess to see lights at the ends of tunnels. We should not employ short-term rationales, out of short-term expediency, when in fact much remains to be done. • We should never assume that inconsistencies in our poli- cies, or foul-ups in their implementation, will go unnoticed by the fourth estate. We will have to live with the fact that mistakes will be exposed (as well as, unfortunately, the fact that any course of action, right or wrong, will be second-guessed). • We should insure [ sic ] that Congress is on board not only at the outset of foreign commitments, but at every stage at which any escalation of our commitment or involvement is contem- plated. In the absence of congressional support, clearly, commit- ment beyond a certain level is impossible. • Consistent with the requirements of military security, our basic policy decisions should be publicly stated and defended. n