The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2015

58 JULY-AUGUST 2015 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL The Kissinger Memo In National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s view, Vietnam offered very few lessons that could be usefully applied elsewhere. A t your request, I have prepared some thoughts on the “lessons of Vietnam” for your consideration and for your background informa- tion in dealing with further press questions on the subject. It is remarkable, considering how long the war lasted and how intensely it was reported and commented, that there are really not very many lessons from our experience in Vietnam that can be usefully applied elsewhere despite the obvious temptation to try. Vietnam represented a unique situation, geographically, ethnically, politically, militarily and diplomatically. We should probably be grateful for that and should recognize it for what it is, instead of trying to apply the “lessons of Vietnam” as universally as we once tried to apply the “lessons of Munich.” Memorandum 3173-X: The White House, Washington Secret/Sensitive/Eyes Only Memorandum For: The President From: Henry A. Kissinger Subject: Lessons from Vietnam Declassified E.O. 12957, Sec. 3.5, NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept Guidelines, by KBH, NARA, Date 2/10/00, Gerald R. Ford Library The real frustration of Vietnam, in terms of commentary and evaluation, may be that the war had almost universal effects but did not provide a universal catechism. A frequent temptation of many commentators has been to draw conclusions regarding the tenacity of the American people and the ultimate failure of our will. But I question whether we can accept that conclusion. It was the longest war in American history, the most distant, the least obviously relevant to our nation’s immediate concerns, and yet the American people supported our involvement and its general objectives until the very end. The people made enormous sacrifices. I am convinced that, even at the end, they would have been prepared to support a policy that would have saved South Vietnam if such an option had been available to use. It must not be forgotten that the decisions of American administrations that involved this nation in the war were generally supported at the time they were taken, and that they