The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2017

18 JULY-AUGUST 2017 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL practice of questioning the loyalty of indi- vidual career public servants because they worked in the previous administration are troubling phenomena. And I fear they reflect dismissiveness about the role of diplomacy and diplomats that is not only regrettable, but deeply counterproductive. What we’re risking—despite the fine and capable people at the top of this administration’s national security team and the truly heroic efforts of our career colleagues under extremely tough cir- cumstances—is the hollowing out of the ideas, initiative and institutions on which American leadership and international order rest. American Leadership and International Order The idea of America has been at the heart of our success in the world for 70 years. For all our imperfections, we have embodied political and economic openness, respect for human dignity and a sense of possibility. The power of our example has mattered more than the power of our preaching, and enlightened self-interest has driven our strategy. But what we see bubbling to the surface at this moment of uncer- tainty is far more focus on “self” than “enlightened”—a nasty brew of mercan- tilism, unilateralism and unreconstructed nationalism. At a moment when interna- tional order is under severe strain, power is fragmenting and great-power rivalry has returned, the values and purpose at the core of the American idea matter more than ever. American initiative—the willingness and ability to mobilize others to deal with shared problems—is another crucial asset at risk. From regional challenges to wider global dilemmas such as climate change, U.S. leadership has been critical to the unprecedented peace and prosper- ity of the post-World War II era. Of course … we got a lot wrong and made our share of serious mistakes. And, of course, we need to make significant adjustments in a world in which the United States is no longer dominant but still pre-eminent. But too many people in today’s Wash- ington seem to see the United States as a hostage to the very international order it created. Alliances are millstones, multilateral arrangements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and NAFTA are constraints rather than opportuni- ties, and the United Nations and other international bodies are distractions, if not irrelevant. We’re Gulliver, in their view, and it’s time to break the bonds of the Lilliputians. That is more than just an attitude, and more than just a new articulation of a recurring isolationist instinct in U.S. poli- tics. It’s already proving corrosive, by cre- ating a trade vacuum in Asia that China is eagerly filling; threatening to squander hard-won gains in our own hemisphere and Africa; and unnerving European allies by indulging populist nationalists and encouraging more Brexits. At the same time, we risk the decay of institutions that translate American ideas and initiative into action. By continuing to rely so heavily on hard power, we con- tinue to reinforce a calamitous pattern in which we have often inverted the roles of force and diplomacy. Force becomes our tool of first resort, with diplomacy its under-resourced enabler, rather than diplomacy enabled by the vast potential of the American military, as well as our rich array of economic, development and soft-power capabilities. Of course we have to substantially reform domestic and international agen- cies. No one is more familiar with—or been more frustrated by—the imperfec- tions and inefficiencies of this depart- ment than we are. Substantial streamlin- ing is long overdue. And it’s about time that we took effective aim at the balloon- ing of seventh-floor staff, the endless layering of bureaucracy, the bottomless clearance pages, and the proliferation of special envoys and offices. And I haven’t even mentioned travel orders and other byzantine administrative processes, a form of self-flagellation that we are espe- cially adept at in this department. But reform ought to be motivated by an interest in strengthening American diplomacy, not sidelining it. Long delays in filling bureau and embassy leadership posts eviscerate morale and undermine our capacity to promote our interests, defend our policies and ensure the safety and security of American citizens. And draconian reductions in assistance pro- grams are penny-wise but pound-foolish. Our foreign aid barely makes a dent in the federal budget, but gutting it guarantees the kind of state failures and conflicts that often drag in the U.S. military, at far greater cost in blood and treasure. That is not just the self-serving view of the diplomatic community, but Our foreign aid barely makes a dent in the federal budget, but gutting it guarantees the kind of state failures and conflicts that often drag in the U.S. military, at far greater cost in blood and treasure.