The Foreign Service Journal, July/August 2018

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JULY-AUGUST 2018 47 Where We Slipped Ron Roughead Chief of the Kenya U.S. Liaison Office “Memories are the key not to the past, but to the future,” as Corrie Ten Boom famously observed. I remember telling people weeks after the bombing in Nai- robi that it was just like a scene from a movie. But it was actually nothing like that. It was real and it was horrific; and the memo- ries haunt many of us to this day. But memories are fragile things that ebb and flow over time. The bombing of the American embassies 20 years ago summons images of those we loved, and those with whom we laughed and cried. My memory of that time invokes individual auras of compassion, heroism and leadership. It also offers the sharp and cutting edge of the evil that used the bombing as a launching pad for global terror. A Vai (Liberian) tribal proverb says: “Do not look where you fell, but where you slipped.” Where we slipped is the blade that cuts into my memories of those who died that day. This story is, in fact, a rebuke of our government’s agencies and leaders, who did not put a high enough value on lives lost—not only in Nai- robi and Dar es Salaam, but in other attacks on our diplomatic outposts since Beirut in 1983. It is an admonition of the recidi- vism of the commissions, reports, investigations and boards that, since 1983, have pointed the finger at security, policy and intelli- gence failures, but have failed to hold accountable the seemingly unaccountable centers of power and their decision-makers. Time and again, after a catastrophic event the pattern begins with condemnation and a declaration of thoughts and prayers. That is soon followed by a promise: “We will get to the bottom of this travesty by conducting a thorough study, appointing a blue-ribbon commission, accountability board or a complete review.” This is usually accompanied by the prom- ise that “We will fix what was wrong and establish accountabil- ity.” The Accountability Review Boards’ reports on the facts and circumstances surrounding the 1998 embassy bombings have disturbingly similar verbiage to the Inman Report, which was published after the bombing of the Marine Barracks and the attack on the U.S. embassy in Beirut in 1983. In part, the Africa report states: “The Boards were most disturbed at two interconnected issues: first, the inadequacy of resources to provide security against terrorist attacks and, second, the relative low priority accorded security concerns throughout the U.S. government—by the department, other agencies in general and on the part of many employees both in Washington and in the field. Saving lives and adequately addressing our security vulnerabilities on a sustained basis must be given a higher priority by all those involved if we are to prevent such tragedies in the future.” It continues: “The Boards did not find reasonable cause to believe that any employee of the United States Government or member of the uniformed services breached his or her duty in connection with the Aug. 7 bombings. However, we believe there was a collective failure by several Administrations and On March 3, 2003, the United States inaugurated a new embassy in the suburb of Gigiri, Nairobi. DEPARTMENTOFSTATE/PUBLICDOMAIN