The Foreign Service Journal, July/August 2018

72 JULY-AUGUST 2018 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL and planning in a whole-of-government effort that coordi- nates agencies including active military? And then there are questions of money. Just how much can money buy; how to account for it; and how much oversight is enough? It is not that we haven’t studied these questions. Numer- ous studies have sought to capture the lessons learned from the Afghanistan experience, and the learning process is far from over. USAID’s work in Afghanistan continues: so does the learning. This article summarizes a few thoughts based on more than three years of involvement, first as mission director in Kabul and later as head of USAID’s Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs. I have seen firsthand that money is not enough; enduring development results will always be difficult to achieve in an active war zone. Progress is complicated by the continuing lack of security, the fragility of government institutions and a lack of agreement—between the government and its supporters, donors and their constituents—on what can be achieved and in what period of time. And it is my experience that whether it concerns the broader interagency, a four-star general or the White House Special Representative, USAID needs to be clear about realistic timelines, sustainability issues and risks. Expectations must be kept reasonable, especially in complex environments. The Issue of Expectations The expectations for what USAID, a relatively small agency, could do to support the Department of Defense and State Depart- ment’s work in a high-conflict region were unrealistic in terms of what might be achieved, the available time and the resources required. In 2002 Afghanistan was just starting to rebuild from scratch after decades of civil war, poor or nonexistent infrastruc- ture, a lost generation, millions of refugees, extremely low literacy and limited government. The George W. Bush administration asked USAID to design and implement hundreds of millions of dollars of stabilization programs in direct support of U.S. troops in key terrain districts. This required surging its staff quickly from 100 to 400 American development per- sonnel, who would be posted to provincial reconstruc- tion teams (PRTs) across Afghanistan. USAID then had to push its programs directly through nascent government systems, in essence making a government known for its corruption responsible for up to 50 per- cent of a multibillion-dollar program. In short, USAID was asked to undertake a range of work it would nor- mally not undertake—all on an urgent basis and with extraordinary scrutiny from several U.S. government inspectors general and from Congress. Despite the unrealistic nature of the demands, much has been accomplished. Millions of Afghan children, including millions of young Afghan girls, are in school today. Primary health care has expanded across the country, significantly reducing maternal and under-5 mortality. Life expectancy jumped from 41 years in 2001 to more than 61 years by 2011. Highways, secondary roads, irrigation systems, schools and clinics now exist in much of the country. Electricity now reaches almost 33 percent of the popula- tion, up from around 5 percent in 2001. The country’s media are active and vibrant. Last and scarcely least, a functioning govern- ment has carried out five elections. Development takes time. At USAID, we had to constantly remind ourselves that our work has always been more a mara- thon than a sprint—and not always consistent, unfortunately, with the timelines of our DOD and State colleagues. The Cost of Surges Rapid changes in commitment, in terms of budget and staffing, carry costs. In December 2009 President Barack Obama announced a major increase of U.S. troops and civilian employees in Afghanistan. Although the military surge may have had some success, the civilian surge accompanying it was problematic. USAID was asked to play a major role in the civilian surge by rapidly placing American development and stabilization experts on PRTs, on district support teams and in the regional commands around the country. Because USAID simply did not have enough direct-hire career staff to fill the requirement, the agency had to recruit large numbers of non-U.S. government and development experts quickly from outside of USAID. Because of the urgency of getting civilians into the field, there was no time to adequately train these new employees; many lacked knowledge of USAID and its systems or experience in government. They were generally The political demands on USAID were so high that the agency shifted an increasing part of its development effort into short-term, quick-response, quick-impact programs in conflict areas.