The Foreign Service Journal, July/August 2018

74 JULY-AUGUST 2018 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL Stabilization and Counterinsurgency: Necessary but Not Sufficient Stabilization programs are necessary but not sufficient to help communities recover from conflicts. They need to link closely to diplomatic and security efforts to build and maintain peace, to increase citizen and community support for the government and decrease support for insurgents. To work, they need a reasonably secure environment; but they do not have the power to impose security themselves. Despite measurable and meaningful successes in education, health, energy—and even governance—the idea that USAID projects could stabilize a district or counteract armed insurgency has proved aspirational. Although USAID’s first stabilization program in Afghanistan was launched in 2002 (andmanaged by the agency’s Office of Transition Initiatives), the 2009 military and civilian surge, with its focus on counterinsurgency, led to a significant expansion of stabi- lization programming. The agency funded stabilization programs to support the U.S. military’s “clear, hold and build” approach to counterinsurgency in areas designated key terrain districts. The political demands on USAIDwere so high that the agency shifted an increasing part of its development effort into short-term, quick- response, quick-impact programs in conflict areas. Four examples stand out: the multi-hundred-million- dollar Stabilization in Key Areas programs, the Afghanistan Vouchers to Increase Production program, the Afghanistan Social Outreach program and the Strategic Provincial Roads Southern and Eastern Afghanistan program. The final reports and audits of these programs were not encouraging. A 2015 Center for American Progress study of the U.S. civilian surge reported that many short-term gains were temporary; that the building of Afghan government functions was unsystematic; and that USAID and other U.S. government civilians in the field were often used to support military tactical efforts rather than to produce strategic shifts in governance or development policy or programs. A 2016 USAID-funded quantitative assess- ment on the impact of stabilization program- ming in Afghanistan found that stabilization programs generally had only a modest impact on violent conflict and other key outcome measures, and that smaller projects were better targeted and less likely to fuel instability and corruption (“Aid and Stabilization in Afghani- stan: What Do the Data Say?” USIP, 2017). The Risks of Going On-Budget Pushing to deliver assistance through the host government before it is ready carries risks. At the 2010 London Conference for donors aiding Afghanistan, the United States made a political commitment to work toward providing half of all its development assistance on-budget—meaning through Afghan government systems. The intent was to increase the Afghan government’s capacity to carry out its own development programs, decrease the costs of such programs for donors and emphasize local solutions to local problems. These are all worthy objectives. However, this occurred at a time when corruption was rife—in 2013 Afghani- stan was tied for last place on Transparency International’s Cor- ruption Perception Index. USAID Afghanistan had an annual budget of more than $1 billion at the time. To move half of these funds, on top of the on-budget multidonor trust funds, through government-to- government programs was not only a major challenge institution- ally and operationally; it was also very risky. USAID staff in Kabul worked within the agency’s internal accountability rules on host- government financing, negotiating an agreement with the Afghan Ministry of Finance to establish strict safeguards for government- to-government programs. USAID put in place several on-budget programs, includ- ing in health, education, mines and petroleum, as well as for the national electrical utility and the civil service commission. Expenditures were tracked extremely closely; entire teams in USAID were assigned to oversee each program. Systems were put in place to ensure accountability. Because the programs were labor-intensive and required constant direct support and oversight, USAID and the govern- ment looked for additional approaches. In early 2015, USAID and the Afghan government came up with a better way, an incentive program called the New Development Partnership. The NDP made a substantial part of USAID’s budget available to support the government’s key actions and reforms that showed clear The expectations for what USAID, a relatively small agency, could do to support Department of Defense and State Department work in a high- conflict region were unrealistic.