The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2019

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JULY-AUGUST 2019 11 Economic Security Is National Security Ambassador Barbara Stephenson andMessrs. Daniel Crocker and Shaun Donnelly eloquently make the case for an immedi- ate, deeper commitment to upping our economic and commercial diplomatic game in the January-February FSJ ’s “Eco- nomic Diplomacy Works” focus. Never have American firms faced such complex competitive challenges across the globe, ranging fromwell-financed state-owned entities, intellectual property theft and non-tariff barriers to aggressive marketing and secure deals. Passage of the BUILD Act and U.S. EXIMBank’s return to full financing capac- ity are good, but we must better integrate all elements of commercial diplomacy. Interagency advocacy alone will not win the day without a robust set of strategically positioned tools and boots on the ground. Playing an indispensable role on the ambassador’s country team are Foreign Commercial Service officers deployed in more than 70 markets. Often drawn from private sector backgrounds, FCS officers work collaboratively within our overseas missions to define and support U.S. inter- ests, openmarkets, win deals, and promote investment and jobs in the United States. The recent FY19 congressional appro- priation for State operations represents a welcome down payment tomove State economic reporting officers back into the field overseas. In contrast, FCS struggles with declining resources that have shrunk our officer corps by 10 percent and left more than 100 key vacancies in the United States and overseas. Fortunately, our congressional appro- priators continue to recognize that FCS returns $392 for every appropriated dollar, temporarily staving off evenmore draco- nian budget cuts. Our assistant secretary LETTERS designate fully understands the challenge, bringing strong leadership and fresh perspectives to the issues. For the first time since 2015, we are recruiting new FCS officers to rebuild the ranks. We have seen a small, initial thaw in our years-long Civil Service and locally employed staff hiring freeze. These long-overdue personnel moves will help to address the trade deficit, made especially urgent as our Asian and Euro- pean competitors grow their overseas staff by double digit percentages. American global economic competi- tiveness is a multigenerational challenge that will require a sustained, bipartisan strategy that integrates policy goals, department budgets and outcomes. The ballast that vibrant U.S.-host country commercial ties can provide is critical to balancing other even more contentious areas of a bilateral relationship, be they in labor and human rights, counterterror- ism or law enforcement and intelligence cooperation. Muscular, properly resourced eco- nomic diplomacy can support and advance broader U.S. foreign policy interests—but only if we provide the resources to do so. If we truly believe that our economic security is intricately linked to our national security, we need to put our money where our mouth is. Michael A. Lally Senior FSO USFCS, Embassy Kyiv Peacekeeping and Borders I read with interest Ambassador Den- nis Jett’s May article on the dismal record of recent United Nations peacekeeping efforts ( “Why Peacekeeping Fails” ). Having served as the deputy special representative of the secretary-general of theMultidimen- sional Integrated StabilizationMission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) at its creation, I share his concern. As we worked to put together MINUSCA in 2014, I saw firsthand how dif- ficult it was to line up troop-contributing countries. To a large extent, MINUSCA ended up with the troops it could get, not the ones who were truly prepared to oper- ate in the violently chaotic environment that awaited them. Where Ambassador Jett begins to go astray, however, is in identifying violent extremism as the key cause of state failure in his five target countries (Sudan, South Sudan, CAR, Democratic Republic of the Congo andMali). I do not claimmuch knowledge about the Sudans. But he misses the mark on the other three. Violence in the DRC, for example, has been blamed onmany factors, but violent extremism is not one of them. In CAR, the “Seleka” rebel force of 2013 may have been largely Muslim, but they were fortune- seekers, not jihadists. Their focus was on controlling major income sources, ranging fromdiamond and goldmining to the lucrative regional cattle trade. InMali, it is true that jihadist groups have played a major role in the violence. However, the struggle to control lucrative trafficking routes and long-standing North- South tensions are at least as important. Jett is somewhat closer to the mark in focusing on the role of systemic gover- nance failure. But while governance has long been an egregious problem in the DRC, the governments of Mali and CAR have not been particularly repressive. Nor have their levels of corruption been unusual within the region. In fact, Mali was seen as a political and economic success story only a few years ago, while CAR’s current president emerged from an election widely con- sidered one of the fairest in the region. In short, poor governance alone does not