The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2019

28 JULY-AUGUST 2019 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL their children (their only child in both cases) into universities in the United States. These children are not studying in techni- cal fields. One wanted to study communications and media, the other international relations. These parents, who are not rich, are prepared to spend a huge proportion of their savings and income on sending their children to the United States to study. President Xi Jinping’s daughter studied and worked in the United States until he was elevated to general secretary of the Chinese Community Party. As any parent who has sacrificed for their chil- dren’s education knows, that says more about China’s attitude toward America than any strategy document or com- munist party pronouncement. When you go to China and talk to young people, they’ll tell you that they don’t like the way the U.S. government talks about their country, but they all want to go to school in America, work for a U.S. company or travel to the United States. This is what success looks like. America is still “a shining city upon a hill” for most Chinese. They understand that China’s ability to reach its dream is inextricably bound up with con- tinued connections to the outside world, including the United States. Of course, there are exceptions: Chinese nationalists who preach autarky, PLA officers who advocate militarism, Chinese CEOs who want protectionism. Some are powerful, as vested interests tend to become in maturing systems and economies, but they are a vocal minority. U.S. Strategy Needed It is impossible to say at this point what China’s future will be. It is still an open question. Those who would claim that China’s future course is set and unchang- ing are mistaken. If, due to our own ideological blinders and shortsighted political narratives, we abandon the effort and miss the opportunity to help shape China toward a better future, our children will rightly blame us. Even if China does not become an electoral democracy, the power of American influence in the world will surely change China, just as China’s growing influence will change America. It is delusional to think otherwise. The question is whether U.S. diplomacy will have some input in its design, or not. We could, of course, continue to shun diplomacy and stoke the escalatory cycle of strategic adversity. This seems to be the direction for the foreseeable future. Those promoting this approach say that Beijing only responds to force, that tension is a necessary feature of the relationship and that Chinese and U.S. interests are implacably opposed. But even if claims about a secret Chinese plot to bury the United States were accurate, it is difficult to see how an endless string of U.S. provocations without a strategy and absent coordination with others will achieve anything other than heightened suspicions, further recriminations and, likely, a premature crisis. This will do nothing to further U.S. inter- ests, to say nothing of the interests of our allies around the world, and it will harmU.S. credibility and leadership. Allies and partners of the United States, many of whom rely on China’s economy as an engine of growth at home, are loath to see a rupture in Sino-American relations. They do not want COURTESYOFSUSANTHORNTON Susan Thornton (center) at her farewell party with colleagues from the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs in July 2018. The summer palace in Beijing. COURTESYOFSUSANTHORNTON