The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2019

46 JULY-AUGUST 2019 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL According to the results of an annual business confidence survey by the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, more than 95 percent of the 663 members surveyed believe the city’s business environment will be “favorable” or “very favorable” for the next five years—the highest approval rating since the survey began in 1992. —Dan Kubiske, a Foreign Service spouse and freelance writer, from “A City Bullish on Itself, ” in the March 1997 FSJ Focus on Hong Kong. Delinking MFN Status from Human Rights: Lessons Learned In the six-month aftermath of President Clinton’s decision not to link human rights with Most Favored Nation status for China, the two most important lessons learned were about politics: the enormous influence wielded by the U.S. business bloc in Washington and the subtle influence of U.S. companies in China in moving forward Clinton’s agenda there. The United States wields tremendous influence in China—most notably through resident U.S. companies. Those who work here feel it every day. Americans are consulted by government ministries on the wording of laws; American businesses’ complaints receive hearings at the highest levels of government; American execu- tives visit towns and cities in China’s hinterlands as celebrities, representatives of the all-powerful Western capital. Any third-string manager froman American company can get ameeting with a city mayor in China, and the hint that a company may be consider- ing an investment is considered a red alert that will draw officials away fromother duties to listen to whatever criticisms the foreigner might have of the local investment environment. Americans are strong partly for cultural reasons, but mostly because of their happy and well-paid look. Americans carry the promise of prosperity. —Anne Stevenson-Yang, head of the Beijing office of the U.S.-China Business Council, from “Why MFNWon in China” in the November 1994 FSJ . Did the U.S. Miss a Chance to Change Postwar History in Asia? Ever since Robert Blum’s article “Peiping Cable: A Drama of 1949” appeared in the Aug. 13, 1978, New York Times and revealed the existence of a top secret message to the “highest American authorities” purportedly from Chou En-lai, there has been speculation as to its significance for Sino-American rela- tions. Some scholars have strongly questioned its validity, while others have cited it to support the view that the United States had a genuine opportunity to reach an understanding with the Chinese Communist leadership in the late spring of 1949. In the course of some research at the Public Record Office in London in the late spring of 1981, I came across Foreign Office documents dealing with this same message as it was received by the British government. Both versions argued that the leadership of the Chinese Com- munist Party (CCP) was bitterly divided between a strongly pro- Moscow radical faction under the leadership of Liu Shao-ch’i and a liberal faction under Chou En-lai’s leadership. The latter advocated early establishment of relations with the Western powers since they alone could help China out of its dire economic straits. A victory for the Chou faction wouldmean that the CCP would not always followMoscow’s foreign policy lead but would exercise a moderat- ing influence, thus reducing the danger of war. —EdwinW. Martin, a retired FSOwho served in China (1946-1949) and as director of the State Department Office of Chinese Affairs (1958-1961), from his “The Chou Démarche” in the November 1981 FSJ . What Lies Ahead for America and China? The convulsions in Chinese political life today baffle insight into our future relations with Peking, because they are the chaotic phenomena of a revolutionary transition. Mao’s personal rule has already outlived its historical usefulness for China, and like all anachronisms eventually will be superseded. Yet the issue of China’s destiny can only be determined within the Chinese political structure. Meanwhile, the United States is obliged to help frustrate Mao’s policy of militaristic expansionism, whether direct as in the case of India or indirect as in the case of Laos and Vietnam. The choice afforded the United States is between a firm containment which keeps doors open to the possibility of a fundamental change in policy by China … and a policy of progressive escalation, directed at finding a terrain on which U.S. “victory” (and Chinese humilia- tion) can somehow be established. The keys to a wise choice between them are patience, prudence, and steadfastness: the patience to realize that changes in China’s attitude toward the outside world will come slowly, through modification of the entire regional environment, and not through isolatedmilitary measures; the prudence to adjust the necessary use of force to the dimensions of the particular issue at stake; and the steadfastness where necessary to sustain drawn-out, indeci- sive campaigns throughout the Asian periphery as the price of an eventual stabilization. —WilliamN. Stokes, FSO, from his article, “The Future between America and China, ” in the January 1968 FSJ.