The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2020

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JULY-AUGUST 2020 75 When President Trump announced in October 2019 that the United States was withdrawing its forces from Syria—later amended to a commitment to maintain a few hundred troops to guard the oil fields—Russian troops immediately moved into an abandoned U.S. base. Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed to jointly patrol the area from which Kurdish fighters have been driven. Putin has always claimed that Russia was in Syria legitimately because it was invited in by Assad, whereas the United States was there illegitimately, trying to effect regime change against the legitimately elected leader in Damascus. So Russia welcomed the partial U.S. withdrawal, although American troops and Russian mercenaries continue to have tense encounters in northeast Syria. Indeed, in March U.S. Special Envoy for Syria James Jeffrey accused Moscow of trying to challenge the U.S. presence in northeastern Syria by violating the terms of a deconfliction agreement and escalating the fight- ing in the northwestern province of Idlib. The ongoing battle in Idlib province has also strained relations between Moscow and Ankara. The Russian-Turkish relationship has become more brittle as Putin and Erdogan support different sides in the Syrian civil war. Moscow has ben- efited from the growing strains in U.S.-Turkish relations and has recently sold the S-400 air defense system to Ankara, a major challenge for NATO. But Russian-Turkish relations came under great strain after an airstrike by Russian-backed Assad forces killed at least 33 Turkish troops in northwest Syria. Erdogan reacted very strongly against Russia, even traveling to Ukraine in February and telling President Volodymyr Zelensky that Crimea is Ukrainian. There was concern about a possible Russo-Turkish military confrontation, but in the end Erdogan went to Moscow and the two sides signed a cease-fire and agreed to joint patrols. The COVID-19 pandemic appears to have slowed down the fighting, but the situation remains tense: Turkey is determined to continue to occupy its zone around Idlib; and Assad, backed by Russia, is committed to subduing Idlib and declaring the civil war over. Now that Russia is the predominant external actor in Syria, is it really the winner? Once the civil war ends, Moscow will largely be responsible for the reconstruction of the country. Russia does not have the wherewithal to pay for the enormous costs of reconstruction, and it has already appealed to the European Union and other countries to contribute, so far with little success. Moreover, although Russia and Iran have so far worked together during the Syrian conflict, with their joint aim of keeping Assad in power, it is not clear, once the war is over, that their goals will coincide. Russia has been convening differ- ent groups designed to reconcile the various political factions in a postwar Syria, and has managed to persuade adversaries Turkey and Iran to sit at the same table. But so far it has proved a major challenge to persuade the contentious Syrian groups themselves to sit together. Recently, the Kremlin has reportedly been insisting that Assad show more flexibility in talks with the Syrian opposition on a political settlement to end the conflict. Russian and Saudi Arabia: Is the Oil War Over? At the 2019 Valdai International Discussion Club meeting in Sochi in September, OPEC Secretary General Mohammed Barkindo said that the 2016 alliance between Russia, Saudi Ara- bia and OPEC had “saved” OPEC, and Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak likewise praised the agreement for bolster- ing Russia’s oil industry. A mere six months later, when Riyadh tried to impose much deeper production cutbacks ahead of the expiration of the current arrangement, Russia abandoned its agreement with the Saudis, oil prices collapsed and relations between Moscow and Riyadh soured. Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin had been critical of any arrangement limiting Russia’s ability to produce oil. “If you give up market share,” he warned, “you never get it back.” Angered by U.S. sanctions against the Nord- stream 2 gas pipeline and against Rosneft subsidiaries exporting Venezuelan oil, and hoping to put U.S. shale producers out of business, Russia refused to further cut oil production. However, Putin had not reckoned with the devastating effects of COVID-19 on the Russian economy and on global oil demand, which fell precipitously. Russia lacked storage capac- ity for the extra oil. Eventually, under pressure from U.S. oil producers, Donald Trump intervened. After a series of phone calls with the Saudis and Russians, he persuaded the OPEC+ countries to agree to production cutbacks. Indeed, Trump and Putin pledged that this could open up a new period of U.S.- Russian cooperation. The monthlong Russian-Saudi oil “war” and its resolution showed that relations between the two countries involve more than oil. Moscow and Riyadh have developed an economic and security partnership that the Kremlin will continue to pursue as it seeks to strengthen its presence in the Middle East. Now that Russia is the predominant external actor in Syria, is it really the winner?