The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2020

76 JULY-AUGUST 2020 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL Russia and the Middle East after COVID-19 Russia’s capacity to expand its presence in the Middle East could, of course, be limited by the longer-term effects of the pandemic on the Russian economy. The Syrian operation has, so far, not required significant resources. Putin has been a talented tactician in the Middle East—as elsewhere—taking advantage of opportunities presented to him by Western indecision and inac- tion to insert Russia into Syria and beyond. So far the focus has been on ensuring that Russia remains a player in the region and concluding profitable deals there. Moreover, the Kremlin relies heavily on private military groups such as the Wagner Group—as opposed to the Russian armed forces—to do most of the fighting in the Middle East. In May, the United States reported that Rus- sia was sending fighter jets to Libya to support Russian merce- naries and Syrian soldiers fighting alongside rebel commander General Haftar against the U.N.-recognized Libyan government, which is backed by Turkey. Despite the pandemic, Russia has stepped up its involvement in the Libyan civil war. It is unclear whether Putin has a longer-term strategy for the Middle East. Russia cannot replace the United States, either economically or militarily, in the region. But if Washington continues its withdrawal from the area—a process that the pandemic could accelerate—Russia will surely pursue future opportunities there. This assumes that Russia emerges from the current COVID-19 crisis with its attendant economic contrac- tion, and is still able to project power beyond its borders. So far, despite its severe domestic toll on the Russian population, the pandemic does not appear to be constraining Russia’s activities in the Middle East. n Putin has been a talented tactician in the Middle East—as elsewhere—taking advantage of opportunities presented to him by Western indecision and inaction.