The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2023

104 JULY-AUGUST 2023 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL good use of this train of thought, promis- ing to stay out of direct governance.) In February 1978 rioting in the holy city of Qum in response to a newspaper article questioning the Ayatollah’s morals was put down by security forces. There were a number of deaths. The demonstra- tions spread, and “martyrs” multiplied. The bazaaris (merchants) became important participants in the political scene after being forced by police to limit their prices in Iran’s inflationary economy that was caused by the shah throwing all his oil earnings into an effort to raise Iran to one of the most important countries in the world. We were reliably informed that their efforts to reason with Khomeini in Paris were fruitless. Warnings about the evils of the shah’s regime came regularly to us from prominent American professors who visited Tehran, but the predictions had no timelines and seemed to assume that the fall of the shah would lead directly to democracy. Among other things, we never pre- dicted the arrival of democracy. (For what it is worth, my own guess was, and still is, that a continuing popular uprising will be followed by a military takeover.) My own 1978 mission to Washington on behalf of Ambassador Sullivan was to tell our highest leaders in Washington (with the exception of President Carter) that the fear of a communist takeover with Soviet assistance being broadcast by the shah was wrong and that Kho- meini’s clerics would control the security situation, however poor their economic policies could be. Carter (and Sullivan in Tehran), of course, had to deal with contradictory advice from National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski (who was respond- ing to Iran’s ambassador in Washington, whose father helped return the shah to his throne in 1953) and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (who was responding to our embassy’s pleas not to repeat the 1953 American intervention that was remem- bered so vividly by most Iranians). Iran Today Today many Iranians are suffering economic hardship due to American and other sanctions combined with the obvi- ous enrichment of the ruling mullahs. A surprisingly well-informed article in the French weekly Paris Match (Feb. 2-8, 2023) provides details from several sources on how toman (the Iranian currency) earnings from organizations, enterprises, and drugs or other illegal activities now controlled by the Revolu- tionary Guard are moved by the regime’s Mahan Airline to Turkey for conversion into other currencies and then flown around Europe to hide their provenance. It estimates that $10 billion has left Iran in the last fewmonths, part of an estimated $100 billion stashed away for when the regime falls and they need to escape. In addition, strikes and public protests by essential elements of the Iranian econ- omy such as the Tehran bazaaris, the oil workers, and reportedly even members of the elite such as religious leaders in the city of Qum, remind one of similar events in 1978-1979. The widespread protests in the wake of the September 2022 killing of a young woman for not wearing her hijab hair covering to the satisfaction of the reli- gious police are openly led by women (in 1978-1979, the strong support from women was behind the scenes) and have caused surprise by their endurance. Additional clues as to the seriousness of this challenge to the government are the reportedly widespread cries of “Death to Khamenei,” Iran’s aging supreme leader. These echo the cries of “Death to the Shah” that became widespread in 1979, which by their nature would be heard only when people thought it was safe to shout them. Ironically, these can be contrasted to the frequent post- revolutionary cry of “Death to America” intended to indicate the direction of public loyalty. The brutal efforts by this government to repress the current protests appear even more drastic than those of the shah’s SAVAK secret police, the regular police, and some units of the army. One could argue that the shah fell because of his failure to gauge the strength of the opposition he faced, his frequent indecision, and his final deci- sion to avoid the widespread chaos and bloodshed that his army’s intervention might cause, despite the apparent readi- ness of his generals to try. If the protests continue today, the religious government, led almost entirely by aging men, will face a similar conun- drum: Do you continue to suppress and antagonize more and more of your primarily young citizens backed by their families, or do you make concessions that amount to opening a Pandora’s box only partway—as the shah did and failed? One problem is that you cannot nego- tiate with a movement that so far has no clear leader. Ayatollah Khomeini would not negotiate with the shah, but he was It is not difficult to imagine that private discussions must be taking place in Iran’s military ranks.