The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2023

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JULY-AUGUST 2023 105 opposed by other ayatollahs who pre- ferred to settle for letting the shah remain in power if he substantially moderated his rule. Today’s demonstrators do not appear to be challenged by such opposing views and are sustaining their battle, even with no apparent leader. How far can suppres- sion go before stirring up new opposition to the government? The players who have not yet entered domestic politics are the regular armed forces. They far outnumber the Revolu- tionary Guard and the Basij militia and have the heaviest weapons. But accord- ing to the same Paris Match article cited above, one Amir Hamidi, described as an “American-Iranian spy,” claims that a recent leak showed that more than 4,000 soldiers have resigned from the regu- lar army and that the “guardians of the revolution” have imprisoned at least 80 of their members. A major handicap today is that the United States has no embassy in Iran, and friendly embassies there are not welcome recipients of government infor- mation. Iran watchers have to depend on leaks, deserters, family visitors to Iran, information provided by Israel and Irani- ans in California and all over the world, with little ability to check on the veracity of sources. Nevertheless, whatever the validity of such reports, it is not difficult to imagine that private discussions must be taking place in Iran’s military ranks. These could suddenly blow very loud indeed. Would this government chance a civil war? Unless world press and other reports are mistaken, the current demonstra- tions in Iran appear more long-lasting and effective than those put down by the government in the past. It looks like this ancient, benighted government has lost the confidence of its modernizing people. The recent Chinese-mediated Iran- Saudi détente may provide breathing space to Iran’s government, but it is unlikely to last. Saudi relations with the U.S. and even Israel count more today than with Iran. And the (Sunni) Saudis are reducing religious involvement in their governance, unlike (Shia) Iran. The 1979 overthrow of the shah devel- oped over a year. We shall see how long this takes. n