88 JULY-AUGUST 2025 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL NATO’s enlargement is one of the many public excuses the Kremlin made for its fullscale invasion of Ukraine. The premise is that NATO took advantage of the collapse of the Soviet Union by absorbing former Warsaw Pact countries to threaten and intimidate Moscow. This argument seems to have some tactical merit, but only in hindsight: It does not align with what NATO officials and strategists were planning in 1992. As the information officer at the U.S. mission to NATO from 1996 to 2000, I witnessed the “first” NATO enlargement, when Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined the Alliance. I conducted the NATO Tour program through which our mission supported U.S. and NATO policy by educating target audiences from Russia and former Warsaw Pact countries about NATO and its mission. What NATO Allies were actually working on during my time at NATO was conditioning the entry of new countries to the Alliance until they could meet all political, economic, and military requirements. Under U.S. leadership, the Allies created the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) in 1994 to “enable particiEffective Public Diplomacy During NATO Enlargement BY GORDON DUGUID REFLECTIONS pants to develop an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation, and the level and pace of progress.” In other words, NATO’s policy was to slow things down, rather than expand too hastily. From my engagement with Russian officials, I know any claim by the Kremlin that they believed NATO’s policy of welcoming new members was directed at Russia is spurious. I was in the hallways at NATO headquarters when the first Russian generals were escorted in for military briefings. We were also transparent with Moscow’s political establishment. In January 1997, in advance of the creation of the NATO-Russia Council, USNATO hosted four Russian senators (Federation Council members), explaining NATO’s “Open Door” policy to the group. NATO has never sought out new members, but any democracy in the trans-Atlantic region can request admittance to the Alliance. We reminded the Russian senators that NATO had expanded before: in 1952 when Turkey and Greece joined; in 1955 when West Germany joined; in 1982 when Spain was admitted; and in 1990 when East Germany joined NATO during German unification. None of those enlargements led to any significant change in NATO’s defensive position or, conversely, in Russia’s view of Europe. Putin’s much-quoted offer to Lord Robinson that Russia join NATO is mythical or, at best, ironic, because the post–Cold War order Putin openly desired was that there be no alliances in Europe, only a peace guaranteed by America and Russia over respective spheres of influence. During our briefing, the Russian senators learned that NATO policy permitted European countries to join PfP to be able to cooperate with NATO without becoming members. Most former Warsaw Pact nations had much work to do on their political structures, let alone their military organization, before they would be ready and eligible for NATO membership. Even after two days of briefings, the senators could scarcely believe that each Gordon Duguid joined the U.S. Information Agency in 1990 and retired from the State Department in 2020 with the rank of Minister Counselor. His service included postings in Africa, Europe, South Asia, and Washington, D.C. He is currently the Donald F. McHenry Visiting Professor in Diplomacy and International Affairs at Illinois State University and a member of the Public Diplomacy Council of America. The opinions and characterizations in this piece are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government. Putin’s much-quoted offer to Lord Robinson that Russia join NATO is mythical or, at best, ironic.
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