THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JULY-AUGUST 2025 89 NATO member had an equal voice, even though none could match individually the strength of American arms. For them, the Warsaw Pact was run by Russia for Russia. They presumed it was the same with NATO. I cannot vouch that the senators were convinced of political equality within NATO, but they did not seem to worry about NATO enlargement. As one said to me on their departure: “I hope you take in all the countries from the Warsaw Pact. They’ll kill your organization just like they did ours. They are nothing but trouble.” His prediction has proven wrong—there is zero equivalence between the ethos of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Kremlin knew that NATO would expand because most countries of Central and Eastern Europe were telling everyone, quite openly, that they wanted to join NATO and the European Union (EU). In October 1997, USNATO invited senior officials from the most promising NATO candidates—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—on a NATO Tour of Houston, San Antonio, Chicago, and Washington, D.C. Our goal was that senior officials instrumental in forming NATO policy for candidate countries become well versed with U.S. policy, policymakers, and the political and social conditions in which U.S. policy is made. The trip was also valuable in exposing our guests to U.S. public opinion. For example, they took part in a twohour talk radio show on Houston’s KENR. Listeners wanted to know why our guests’ countries wanted to join NATO and what they could bring to the Alliance. Our guests were surprised to learn that some Americans were skeptical of NATO and its role, so this discussion helped them to address the concerns of skeptics at home. The highlight of the Houston stop was a Baker Institution seminar at which our visitors heard addresses by George H.W. Bush, James Baker, Warren Christopher, Henry Kissinger, and Mikhail Gorbachev. I was able to introduce them to Kissinger, and they sought his advice on which reforms their countries should focus on first. Next, the World Affairs Council of San Antonio arranged a reception with the mayor and his international affairs councilman to discuss how businesses could benefit from Alliance membership. We finished off with a visit to the Defense Language Institute at Lackland Air Force Base to discuss military training for NATO. In Chicago, we met with members of the Council on Global Affairs for further serious discussions on foreign policy. Our itinerary included cultural events— a tour of Chicago’s architecture, a visit to the Chagall mural and Picasso’s sculpture, a stroll along Michigan Avenue, and a raucous dinner at Buca di Beppo’s. Our guests cited these events as just as valuable as the policy briefings. They liked seeing how ordinary Americans lived and thought about global issues. They were touched that I included them in an evening with my family and friends. In Washington, D.C., we met with Susan Eisenhower, the highest-profile American opponent of NATO enlargement; participants said it was the best debate they had on the issue. Our guests explained to Eisenhower that they wanted to be fully in the West because they worried about Russian revanchism but also because they saw the success of the EU and NATO as proof of the validity of the West’s fundamental values. They pointedly noted that such a conversation with an opponent of government policy was something that would have never happened in the Warsaw Pact. The Poles cited NATO’s founding document, saying that to deny membership to any country that met NATO standards would betray the Open Door principle. After 45 years of Russian domination, they were ready to be equals in democratic structures. That feeling was still strong in 2018, when I was serving as chargé in Montenegro. Montenegro joined NATO in 2017, realizing fully that they would be sending their troops to defend U.S. and Alliance interests in Iraq and Afghanistan the day after they got in. NATO did not enlarge as a policy to thwart Russia. Rather, countries in Central and Eastern Europe flock to NATO and the EU as soon as they can because of their experiences under Russian domination and the promise to be equal partners in democratic organizations. This is what the Kremlin still fails to understand. n They pointedly noted that such a conversation with an opponent of government policy was something that would have never happened in the Warsaw Pact.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy ODIyMDU=