The Foreign Service Journal, September 2003

Thanks for June Y’all are putting out many a good issue of the Journal , but you deserve a special commendation for the June issue. It’s not just informative; it’s instructive, even inspiring — particu- larly so for those unfamiliar with the struggles of 30 years ago and for those holding the notion that a union must be an enemy of management, and management an enemy of a union. Congratulations to all the authors who provided insights on how AFSA made history and how it has helped improve the Foreign Service. I was particularly impressed with Hank Cohen’s article for his specific exam- ples of just how a union makes a prac- tical difference. I plan to publicize the June issue on my own Web site (w ww.senser.com), helping your good work get the wide distribution it deserves. Robert A. Senser FSO, retired Editor, Human Rights for Workers Reston, Va. Why So Harsh? I was surprised and disappointed that someone with the long Foreign Service experience and professional credentials of frequent Journal con- tributor David T. Jones would be so contemptuously dismissive of the recent resignations of three FSOs in protest against the Bush administra- tion’s Iraq policy (Speaking Out, June). Jones’ attitude toward the three officers can be summarized in two words: good riddance. (“Don’t let the door hit you on the way out.”) He deprecates their apparent lack of Middle Eastern experience or exper- tise. He also suggests that if they had had “total access and consummate experience” in Middle East issues and could draw on the “full panoply” of information available to the most senior officials, they probably would have agreed with administration poli- cy — or only then would have had credible grounds for resignation. I find Jones’ position both uncharitable and fallacious. I cannot presume to speak for the three resignees. I suspect, however, that the reasons for their decisions to quit involved some or all of the fol- lowing considerations: • Contrary to what Jones seems to suggest, highest-level access to all- source intelligence information does not necessarily guarantee selection of the best policy alternative. Wider political agendas and bureaucratic infighting play an enormous role in issues of “high politics.” • You don’t have to be an expert on either intelligence matters or any par- ticular region of the world to realize that information, especially if it is incomplete or inconclusive, can be open to differing interpretations. • From at least last summer, if not from the January 2002 State of the Union address, the administration seemed hellbent on military action against Iraq, regardless of internation- al opinion or the findings of U.N. weapons inspectors. • Once the U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf region began in earnest, reasons of Realpolitik (i.e., fear of losing face in the Arab world if we backed down) made war virtually inevitable. • Continued resistance by pockets of pro-Saddam loyalists and the grow- ing frustration of ordinary Iraqis over the failure so far of the U.S. occupa- tion authorities to restore even a sem- blance of normalcy show that the Rumsfeld Pentagon paid woefully inadequate attention to “postwar” planning — with American troops on the ground now having to pay the price for that shortsightedness. • It is not a manifestation of over- seas “clientitis” to know that the administration’s avowed policy of “pre-emptive” (“preventive” would be a better word; there is a difference) war scares the daylights out of many peoples and governments around the world — making it that much harder for American diplomats to do their work. • Treating close friends and long- time allies France and Germany as virtual enemies because they dis- agreed with U.S. policy on Iraq (although their positions reflected the overwhelming opinions of their elec- torates) smacks of hubris and petu- lance, not statesmanship or intelligent diplomacy. • Some members of the “neocon- servative” clique who beat the drums most loudly for war in Iraq actively despise the Department of State — viewing it as infested with liberal wimps who are unwilling or incapable of implementing a robust, red-meat poli- cy of going after the world’s bad guys 6 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 3 L ETTERS