The Foreign Service Journal, September 2004

gle official source of intelligence about the political dynamics of for- eign societies. Budgets for lan- guage and reporting have improved after a long decline, but these skills deserve greater resources. No less important, intelligence analysts and Foreign Service reporting officers must not be inhibited by pressure to report what their political bosses in Washington want to hear. Such constraints are heaviest when ideol- ogy and demands for conformity trump open-mindedness and respect for experience among poli- cy-makers. Of course, changes in the structure of the intelligence community are needed to eliminate deplorable failures in intelligence sharing and coordination, some of which con- tributed to 9/11. But any reform must protect competi- tion and diversity among intelligence agencies, which help guard against inevitable pressure for homogenized and “politically correct” analysis. Losing the Hearts and Minds of Muslims The key to successful counterterrorism is eliminating popular support for terrorists and their ideology wherever they operate, as well as winning full cooperation from for- eign governments. There was widespread sympathy for the U.S. among Muslims and Arabs, as in most of the world, following the tragedy of 9/11. But careless rhetoric from Washington about serial wars against other Muslim states suspect of terrorist sympathies, a sharp tilt toward Sharon’s policies in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the war in Iraq have squandered this good will and stirred an unprecedented wave of anti-American hostility through- out the Arab and Muslim world. The war in Iraq has created a new motivation for ter- rorism by resurrecting powerful memories of colonialism, domination and defeat by the non-Muslim West, just as Soviet troops in Afghanistan did in the 1980s. Today, the collapse of the WMD rationale for the war, the lack of evi- dence that Saddamwas behind 9/11, and the belief, which the administration has not tried to rebut, that the U.S. wants oil preferences and military bases in Iraq, have all compounded Arab and Muslim anger. Polls in the region show a widespread perception that the U.S. war against terrorism is actually a war against Islam. The U.S. has struck heavy blows against the operational effective- ness of bin Laden’s original al-Qaida network. But a wider Jihadi move- ment, ideologically linked to al- Qaida, but operationally autono- mous, is growing. This movement, fueled by growing Muslim resent- ment over the perception that Islam itself is under attack from America and the West, constitutes the main terrorist threat today. Its cadres are dispersed, highly mobile, sophisticated, and located worldwide. The most respected terrorism experts, inside and outside the U.S. government, regard this diffuse network as more formidable and implacable than the original al-Qaida. Weakening the Rule of Law The Bush administration’s view that international legal limits on unprovoked war and the treatment of detained terrorist suspects do not bind the U.S. is a major setback for international efforts to strengthen international law as a tool against terrorism. In fact, strengthening a rule- based international legal regime against terrorism and international compliance with this regime are critically important. The general indifference, if not hostility, of the Bush administration toward international law weakens the fabric of global anti-terrorism law and cooperation painstakingly stitched together over many years. The sordid practice of torture by American forces against suspects in Iraq and the indeterminate detention of “enemy combatants” at Guantanamo Bay are egregious examples of this disregard for international law. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has overturned the Bush administration’s assertion of unlimited executive power to detain both certain U.S. citizens and foreign suspects without due process. Such practices put American troops at risk, and undermine the work of generations to adopt rules that make armed conflict more humane. All this plays into the hands of terrorists and other criminal ele- ments that disdain civilized conduct and celebrate force and violence. The Patriot Act, hastily enacted after 9/11, treads on traditionally protected rights against search and surveil- F O C U S S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 4 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 33 The 9/11 Commission Report revealed many weaknesses in U.S. intelligence. But the most cost-effective investment would be funds for greater area and language expertise.