The Foreign Service Journal, September 2004

government of Tanzania recently deported the two top al-Haramain officials and closed the office. In mid-2004 Saudi Arabia and the U.S. designated the al-Haramain branch in Ethiopia as a financier of terrorism. At the same time, under pressure from the U.S., Saudi Arabia outlined plans to dis- mantle its network of international charities and place their assets under a new Saudi National Commission for Relief and Charity. It remains to be seen if this crackdown by Saudi Arabia will put an end to the diversion of charitable donations to terrorists. A Major Change in Policy toward Sudan U.S. relations with Sudan began a downward spiral after an Islamic government entrenched itself in power in the early 1990s and stepped up the war against southern- ers. Sudan opened the door slightly in 1996, however, when it responded positively to a U.S. request to expel Osama bin Laden, who had lived in Khartoum since 1991. This offered the possibility for improved relations, but there was no follow-through by the Clinton adminis- tration. The nadir in the relationship then occurred in 1998 following the bombing of the embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, when the U.S. launched cruise mis- siles against a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum. The U.S. linked the factory to the production of chemical weapons based on a soil sample containing a precursor for the production of weapons found outside the factory. The U.S. also alleged there were ties between the facto- ry owner and al-Qaida. Sudan strongly denied any link and a number of experts who studied the case have raised serious questions about the rationale for the attack. The Clinton administration, which had been under pressure from domestic groups to take a hard line toward Sudan, nevertheless made overtures in 2000 to Khartoum con- cerning possible cooperation on counterterrorism. Sudan responded positively; by the time the Bush admin- istration took power, the scene was set for improved ties. Following the 9/11 attacks, Khartoum quickly con- cluded it was in its interest to increase cooperation with the U.S. on counterterrorism. This provided the Bush administration an opportunity to advance the war on ter- rorism and make progress on end- ing the long-standing civil war in Sudan. President Bush named for- mer Missouri Senator John Danforth as his special envoy for Sudan in an effort to end the civil war. This appointment and policy not only neutralized the American domestic constituency that wanted strong action against Sudan, but turned Sudan into an important ally in the war against terrorism. By all accounts, the regime’s cooperation on counterterrorism has been excellent. In addition, it and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, under pressure from the U.S. and others, have also made enormous progress in ending the civil war. Consequently, Secretary Powell announced in May that the U.S. had removed Sudan from a blacklist of countries deemed not to be cooperating fully on coun- terterrorism. There is still in place a maze of American sanctions, including the listing of Sudan as a “state spon- sor” of terrorism, but this was the first step in unraveling U.S. sanctions against Sudan. The policy change proba- bly would not have occurred except for the traumatic events of 9/11. However, a new crisis in the Darfur region in western Sudan threatens to set back significant- ly the improvement in relations. Quandary over Somalia American and allied forces intervened massively in Somalia late in 1992 to end a famine. They stopped the famine, and all U.S. troops left Somalia by March 1994 following the “Blackhawk Down” episode in Mogadishu. The U.S. and international community effectively aban- doned the failed state, though 9/11 and the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan briefly brought Somalia back into prominence in 2002, due to fears that the vacuum there would provide a safe haven for al-Qaida supporters being chased from Afghanistan. Some of the ideas being discussed in the government for dealing with the country were wildly off the mark, however — no surprise given the loss of expertise that occurred during the post-1994 interregnum. Fortunately, calmer minds prevailed and Washington did not do anything really stupid in Somalia. That said, the country is still a failed state where ter- rorist elements can move with impunity. Somalia has F O C U S 40 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 4 Charities sponsored by Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states have probably financed most of the international terrorist activity in the region.