The Foreign Service Journal, September 2004
been home to al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, a fundamentalist organization that has carried out terrorist attacks against Ethiopia and is believed to have connections with al-Qaida. The U.S. added al-Ittihad in 2001 to its Comprehensive List of Terrorists and Groups. It also included the Somali money transfer organization, al- Barakat, on the list. There is evidence that an al-Qaida cell based in Mogadishu took part in the 2002 attack on an Israeli-owned hotel outside Mombasa and a simul- taneous but unsuccessful attempt to shoot down an Israeli charter aircraft. At the same time, Somalis gen- erally are not predisposed toward Islamic fundamental- ism or entreaties by international terrorists. The situa- tion in Somalia is worrisome and merits close monitor- ing, but it is not even close to the threat once posed by Taliban-governed Afghanistan. There appears, howev- er, to be no agreed-upon U.S. policy for dealing with Somalia. It is long past time to adopt one. A Base in Djibouti The U.S. embassy in Djibouti has traditionally been small and sleepy. But that changed after 9/11. The country now hosts the only U.S. military base in Africa and welcomes coalition forces from France, Germany, Spain and Italy. Some 1,800 American military and civilian personnel currently occupy a former French Foreign Legion facility at Camp Lemonier outside the capital city. Established in October 2002 and known as the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, it is responsible for fighting terrorism in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and Yemen, and in the coastal waters of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. CJTF-HOA’s stated mission is to detect, disrupt and defeat transnational terrorist groups, to counter the re-emergence of transnational terrorism and to enhance long-term stability in the region. The establishment of the base represents a dramatic change for U.S. security policy in Africa since the closure many years ago of the Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya and Kagnew Communications Station in Ethiopia. CJTF-HOA has devoted most of its effort so far to training with allied forces and the armies of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. It has conducted an impressive number of civic action programs that refurbish schools and clinics and provide medical services in the same three countries. CJTF-HOA established a temporary training facility for the Ethiopian military outside Dire Dawa in the southeastern part of the country. Training has begun for the first of three Ethiopian anti-terrorism battalions. It is less clear how much terrorist interdic- tion CJTF-HOA has accomplished. Without providing details, the departing commander stated in May that they have captured “dozens of terrorists” and averted at least five terrorist attacks. Although a good effort, the operation is not free of problems. Relations with Sudan, especially after dis- agreements over the new conflict in Darfur, have not improved sufficiently to engage in military cooperation. Somalia remains in too much disarray to think in terms of projects in country except for the more peaceful and self- declared independent Republic of Somaliland. The U.S. has so far been unwilling to undertake activities in Somaliland that might suggest it recognizes the country. Eritrea claims to seek cooperation with the U.S. on coun- terterrorism, but there have been problems translating this intention into action. There are also some opera- tional issues. Turnover of CJTF-HOA personnel is too frequent, and area and indigenous language expertise are in short supply. American ambassadors in the region, most of whom have only dealt with a military attaché on their own staff, are still learning how to interact with an independent military commander. The East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative After 9/11 the State Department’s Office of Counterterrorism identified East Africa and the Horn, especially Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Tanzania, to be at particular risk. In response, in 2003 the U.S. created a $100 million East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative. This encompasses mili- tary training for border and coastal security, programs to strengthen control of the movement of people and goods across borders, aviation security, assistance for regional programs to curb terrorist financing, police training and an education program to counter extrem- ist influence. There are separate programs to combat money laundering. The major beneficiary so far of this funding has been Kenya. The U.S. is working with Kenyan officials to develop a comprehensive anti-money laundering/coun- terterrorist financing regime. The State Department’s Terrorist Interdiction Program has established a com- puter system that is now operational at select airports in Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia, and is scheduled to go F O C U S S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 4 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 41
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