The Foreign Service Journal, September 2004

Europe & Eurasia: The Freedom Support Act Russia provides an interesting case study of the relative importance of democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy toward a major strategic ally, and challenges the effectiveness of the State Department-USAID rela- tionship. Since 1997, USAID has invested approximately $200 million in pro- moting democracy in Russia. The Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 (Freedom Support Act, P.L. 102-511) authorizes U.S. government assis- tance to the new independent states of the former Soviet Union, which are referred to as Eurasia in USAID. The USAID democracy and governance program includes the following com- ponents: strengthening civil society, building the capacity of Western- oriented political parties to promote political reform, improving the effectiveness of local government, and strengthening judicial sector institutional actors to encourage the rule of law and protection of human rights. USAID/Moscow’s Democracy and Governance Office has histori- cally supported several Russian human rights organizations, many of which are fighting to bring Russia’s federal government to account for the atrocities it has committed against innocent civilians during its two inva- sions and subsequent occupations of Chechnya. But the work of Russian NGOs to instill and promote democ- ratic values and practices directly at the grassroots is undermined, at least indirectly, by the U.S. embassy’s prac- tices of turning a blind eye to these atrocities. U.S. foreign policy places a greater priority on preserving the two coun- tries’ strong bilateral relationship. This relationship is predicated on two considerations, one strategic and one commercial: Russia’s continued sup- port of the U.S. war on terrorism and the continued liberalization of its economy, making it more stable and lucrative for U.S. foreign direct investment. This obvious contradic- tion is not lost on either the Russian people or the Russian government, and ultimately reduces the effective- ness and credibility of U.S. democra- cy promotion efforts there. While USAID was spending, on average, $26 million per year on democracy promotion, Russia was becoming increasingly more authori- tarian, especially under President Vladimir Putin’s administration. Most major independent media outlets were harassed out of existence; the Russian federal government increas- ingly recentralized to consolidate its authority; competition dwindled among rival political parties; and the judiciary continued to remain mostly under the control of the executive branch. In 2001, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (then known as the General Accounting Office) deliv- ered a glum assessment of the impact and sustainability of the rule-of-law programs implemented in Russia (as well as in Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia). The report (GAO-01-354) states: “It is not clear whether U.S.- supported reforms and innovations are likely to be sustained. ... Continuation or expansion of the innovations depends on further fund- ing from the U.S. government or other foreign donors. Despite the accomplishments of the program, progress toward establishing the rule of law has been slow in the new inde- pendent states, and in several coun- tries, including Russia and Ukraine, the situation appears to have deterio- rated in recent years.” To be fair, $26 million per year allocated to democracy and gover- nance programs is a disproportionate- ly small amount for a country of Russia’s size — an estimated popula- tion of 145 million as of July 2003 — and strategic importance. Moreover, Russian government officials as well as officials of the U.S. embassy, albeit off the record in the latter case, have questioned the need and relevance of a USAID mission in Russia, a country which considers itself to be among the world’s major economic and polit- ical players. The United States cer- tainly validates this slightly inflated self-perception by supporting Russia’s continued participation in the annual Group of Eight summits without any conditionality for progress achieved in its political transition. Latin American & Caribbean: Rule-of-Law Programs The rule-of-law programs in Latin America are funded and administered by both the U.S. Department of Justice and USAID, but coordinated ostensibly by the State Department in both Washington and at the country level. As such, they offer a good case study in interagency policy coordina- tion and coherence. In a recent evaluation of the U.S. democracy programs in Latin America, the GAO reported that these programs have had a “limited impact,” and that where gains have 78 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 4 The relationship among USAID, State and the Justice Department has often been “difficult” when it comes to rule-of-law programs.