The Foreign Service Journal, September 2004

been made there are questions regarding their sustainability. This affects U.S. credibility in promoting democracy in the region. As the 2003 report (GAO-03-358) states: “In many cases, the size and scope of U.S.-supported programs have been relatively limited, and countries have not adopted them on a national scale. The inability or unwillingness of host governments to provide the necessary financial, human, and political capital has often negatively affected democ- racy program outcomes in these countries.” As host-country political and financial resources to sustain democracy programs are difficult to mobilize, it is all the more important that U.S. government agencies man- age the assistance resources and pro- grams efficiently. But, as the GAO report notes, the relationship among USAID, State and the Justice Department has often been “difficult” when it comes to rule- of-law programs, one of the four ele- ments of U.S. democracy assistance, and this has hindered long-term joint planning. The GAO goes on to state: “As we noted in a 1999 report, intera- gency coordination on rule-of-law assistance has been a long-standing problem.” From a technical standpoint, the Justice Department focuses on strengthening police forces (through its International Criminal Investiga- tions Training and Assistance Pro- gram) and building up prosecutors’ offices (through the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training) in the opera- tional and tactical aspects of adminis- tration of law and implementing crim- inal (procedural) codes. USAID, by contrast, assumes a more institutional or developmental approach to strengthen other jus- tice-sector actors, including mem- bers of civil society, to engender greater respect for human rights and the rule of law. Both approaches have merit, and both are required to address the region’s complex chal- lenges. The Justice Department has an ally in the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, which supports its “drugs and thugs” approach to pro- moting the rule of law. This strong emphasis on enforcement often over- looks the high level of corruption and low level of institutional credibility of many of the region’s state security forces. USAID democracy and gov- ernance programs struggle to support the institutional development of countervailing forces, such as national human rights ombudsmen and civil society watchdog organizations. They do so in an effort to help create checks and balances for state security forces, which for decades enjoyed impunity for their human rights abuses under U.S.-supported semi- and authoritari- an regimes. Many of these regimes were and continue to be U.S. allies in brutal wars and counterinsurgency campaigns, either as part of the Cold War or more recently the U.S. war on drugs. Besides being unable to manage and balance multiple objectives at either the policy or bureaucratic level, the State Department lacks sufficient technical knowledge and leadership to synthesize the different approaches to promoting the rule of law. Charles Call, of the Governance in War-Torn Societies Project at Brown Uni- versity’s Watson Institute for Inter- national Studies, conducted a detailed assessment of the ICITAP’s history and performance. He concluded: “(W)herever political will for change and institutional development have been lacking, (Justice Department) police training programs have had lit- tle or no success.” Yet many ICITAP and OPDAT programs have been undertaken in this kind of implementing environ- ment, usually at the insistence of the State Department, which views them as integral to higher-priority policy initiatives to promote regional stabili- ty or to complement anti-narcotics programs. The Justice and State Departments’ preoccupation with “going after the bad guys,” i.e., their focus on enforcement at the expense of prevention and awareness, leads them to overlook recipient country government security forces’ consider- able shortcomings in their respect for human rights and the rule of law. A forthcoming book titled Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy , edited by Washington Office on Latin America staffer Eileen Rosen, which evaluates the impact of such programs, rein- forces this conclusion: “The United States has spent more than $25 billion to date on international drug control programs without achieving its goal of reducing the supply of cocaine and heroin entering the U.S. However, the escalation of the drug war has wrought varied but widespread, often profoundly damaging, consequences in the region, straining fragile democ- ratic political systems and turning a blind eye to abusive tendencies in the region’s military and police forces.” Asia & the Near East: The Middle East Partners Initiative According to the State Depart- ment’s Office of the Middle East Partnership Initiative Director Alina Romanowski, MEPI seeks to: “sup- port economic, political, and educa- tional reforms, as well as women’s empowerment in the region. It pro- vides funding to the Arab private sec- tor, academic establishments, think tanks, nongovernmental organizations and other sectors of civil society, drawing upon ‘their creativity, resourcefulness and drive’ to encour- age reforms from within.” The State-USAID Strategic Plan touts MEPI as an example of strong interagency collaboration, but it, too, S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 4 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 79